The Spycatcher Cases by Dane, Philomena M.
Case Comments
The Spycatcher Cases
If the publication of this book in America is to have, for all practical purposes, the effect
of nullifying the jurisdiction of the English courts to enforce compliance with the duty of
confidence, ... then, . . . the English law would have surrendered to the American
Constitution. There the courts, by virtue of the First Amendment, are, I understand,
powerless to control the press. Fortunately, the press in this country is, as yet, not above the
law. . ..
With this statement, Lord Ackner has, perhaps unwittingly, illustrated the vast
difference between the freedom of the press in England and in the United States. In
the United States, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that any system of
prior restraint bears a strong "presumption against its constitutional validity. ' 2 The
government, therefore, "carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the
imposition of such a restraint." ' 3 That burden is not reduced simply because the
government seeks a temporary injunction against the press, because even a slight
delay would interfere with the press's "traditional function of bringing news to the
public promptly." ' 4 In England, however, the presumption is just the opposite. The
courts, when balancing the competing interests between preserving confidentiality
and keeping the public informed, resolve the conflict in favor of prior restraint unless
the latter interest clearly outweighs the public interest in maintaining confidence.
5
The difference between these two approaches is demonstrated by the Spycatcher
cases. If these cases had arisen in the United States, the British claims would have
been rejected in a manner similar to the Supreme Court's dismissal of the temporary
injunctions against the New York Times and Washington Post in New York Times Co.
v. United States.6 In both England and the United States the press sought to disclose
secret activities of the respective governments regarding matters of public concern,
and the governments relied on their national security interests to restrain the press.
The British government's claims, moreover, did not rest on a statutory authorization
allowing for injunctive relief, but rather on a common law action for breach of
confidence. 7 Furthermore, much of the information disclosed by Peter Wright in his
book, Spycatcher, had previously been made public, and thus, the national security
1. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1306 (H.L.(E.)) (per Lord Ackner).
The statement was made in his opinion upholding the temporary injunction that restrained the press from publishing
information obtained from Peter Wright or from his book Spycatcher.
2. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
3. Id.
4. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Lion Lab. Ltd. v. Evans [19851 1 Q.B. 526 (C.A.). See infra text accompanying notes 81-93.
6. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
7. The concurring opinions of Justices White and Marshall, for example, suggest that if statutory authorization
had existed, the result of the case might have been different. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730-48. See United States
v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (V.D. Wis. 1979), in which the court upheld an injunction against the Progressive
based on the danger of the information published and specific statutory authorization of the injunction. The suit was later
dismissed because the information had been independently published by others. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 610
F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
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interest was limited to deterring others from emulating Wright. 8 A court in the United
States would not have found the British government's interests sufficient to meet its
burden to restrain the press from publishing the allegations disclosed by Wright and
therefore would have dismissed its claim for a temporary injunction.
The Spycatcher cases did not, of course, arise in the United States, so the British
government was successful in silencing the press. In fact, the various court decisions
illustrate the government's ability to withhold from the public information it deems
contrary to national security and also demonstrate the lengths to which the
government will go to preserve its interests in confidentiality.
This Comment will focus on those cases, providing an overview of the legal
theories used by the press and the government, and a description of the court
decisions, showing the ease with which the courts resolved the competing interests in
favor of the government. Part I will provide the relevant facts of the cases. Part II will
outline the law of breach of confidence and the provisions of the Contempt of Court
Act. Part III will describe the series of cases in which the English courts upheld a
temporary injunction restraining the press from publishing any information directly or
indirectly attributable to Peter Wright. The cases that established and upheld the
applicability of contempt of court actions against those newspapers and libraries not
bound by the original injunction will also be treated in Part HI. Part IV will focus on
the Hong Kong decisions in which the courts upheld a similar injunction against the
South China Morning Post, and Part V will cover the English courts' decisions
refusing to grant the government a permanent injunction.
I. BACKGROUND AND FAcTs
Peter Wright joined the British Service, M.I.5, 9 in 1955 as a scientific advisor
in its counterespionage branch. 10 During the last years of his service, he acted as a
personal consultant to the Director General on counterespionage and devoted his time
to determining the extent of Soviet penetration of the Service. It When he joined the
Service and again upon his retirement in 1976, Wright signed a declaration similar to
those signed by all civil servants, acknowledging that he was liable to prosecution if
he communicated any information he obtained as a result of his position, unless the
information had been officially made public or the Service gave him permission.12
8. See Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 822-31 (Ch. D.). In the
trial on the main action between the government and the newspapers, the court pointed out that the allegations made in
Spycatcher had been published previously in 12 other books and 3 television programs, including I program that included
an interview with Peter Wright. The government had not taken any action to prevent these publications or broadcasts, even
though they covered materials similar to those contained in Spycatcher.
9. Military Intelligence 5, which is responsible for defending the United Kingdom against espionage, sabotage,
and subversion, is similar to the FBI. The British Security Service, of which M.I.5 is a branch, is required to remain free
from any political bias and is not allowed to make inquiries on behalf of government departments unless an important
public interest relating to defense is involved. See Maxwell-Fyfe Directive, quoted in Attorney-General v. Guardian
Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 813 (Ch. D.).
10. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [19881 2 W.L.R. 805, 813 (Ch. D.).
11. Id.
12. See REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON SEcriON 2 OF iTE OFmcIAL SEcREtrs Acr 1911, 1972, CMND. 5104, at 19. All
employees of the government and anyone receiving confidential information sign a declaration acknowledging that they
are liable for prosecution under the Act if they disclose information in violation of the Official Secrets Act. While these
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After his retirement, Wright submitted a memorandum to the Chairman of the
Select Committee of the House of Commons calling for an inquiry into the Service. 13
He alleged that Sir Roger Hollis, the former director of M.I.5, was a Soviet agent and
that members of the Service had conspired to destabilize the Labor government of
Prime Minister Harold Wilson.14 When Wright decided the Committee's investiga-
tion was inadequate, he made arrangements with Heinemann Australia to publish his
account of the Service in the book Spycatcher.'5
When the British government learned of Wright's plan in September of 1985, it
began proceedings against Wright and his publisher in New South Wales seeking an
injunction against publication, or, in the alternative, an accounting of profits. 16 Both
Wright and Heinemann agreed not to publish his work until the Australian courts
reached a decision.17
In June of 1986 The Guardian and Observer, in articles on the upcoming
trial in Australia, published outlines of the allegations made by Wright in his
unpublished manuscript.1 8 The Attorney General immediately obtained a temporary
injunction, which the Court of Appeal upheld on July 25.19 The injunction prohibited
the papers from publishing any information from or attributed to Wright, but allowed
for disclosure of information previously published in other books and on television
programs broadcast in England. 20 In addition, the injunction allowed the papers to
publish information disclosed in open court in New South Wales and Parliament.2 1
The trial in Australia received a great deal of publicity in England, and on March
13, 1987, Justice Powell in New South Wales dismissed the Attorney General's
claim. He decided that while Wright did not have a statutory duty of confidence, he
did have an equitable one.22 However, because the bulk of the information Wright
sought to disclose was in the public domain, Justice Powell held that the British
government had not demonstrated that the publication of the remaining confidential
information would cause any detriment to the government. 23 The Attorney General
declarations have no legal force, they do outline the restrictions governing the use of official information for nonofficial
purposes.
13. Attorney-General v. Newspapers Publishing Pic. [1987] 3 W.L.R. 942, 946 (Ch. D.).
14. See Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 822-31 (Ch. D.) for an
overview of Wright's allegations. See also Freeman, Peter Wright: The Real Story, The Sunday Times, Oct. 16, 1988,
at 16, col. 3. According to Freeman, Wright admitted that he, in fact, was the ringleader in the plot to destabilize Wilson
and that instead of 30 officers being involved as he claimed in Spycatcher, there were only 8.
15. Attorney-General v. Newspapers Publishing Pic. [1987] 3 W.L.R. 942, 946 (Ch. D.).
16. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 815 (Ch. D.).
17. Id.
18. Attorney-General v. Observer, Ltd. (C.A. July 25, 1986) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). The Observer
article, for example, included Wright's allegations that M.I.5 had "bugged" various friendly and unfriendly diplomatic
offices; that Guy Burgess had attempted to seduce Churchill's daughter, and that M.I.5 had plotted to assassinate President
Nasser of Egypt. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 872 (C.A.).
19. See Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 815-16 (Ch. D.).
20. Id. See also supra note 8.
21. Id. at 815-16.
22. See Attorney-General (U.K.) v. Heinemann Publishers Austl. Ltd. [1987] 8 N.S.W.L.R. 341.
23. Id.
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appealed that decision, and Wright and Heinemann again agreed to delay publication
until the appeal was decided. 24
In April of 1987 the Independent and two other London papers published major
summaries of Wright's book, as did the Melbourne Age and Canberra Times. On
May 3 the Washington Post also published a summary of Wright's allegations. 25 The
Attorney General immediately began proceedings against the English papers for
contempt of court. 26 At the same time, The Guardian and Observer applied to the
court to lift the injunction against them in light of the other papers' disclosures of
Wright's allegations. 27 The court postponed the latter application pending the
resolution of the contempt of court proceedings. 28
On May 14 Viking Penguin announced its intention to publish Spycatcher in the
United States. The British government tried to convince the parent company of
Viking, a British corporation, to use its powers to dissuade the New York subsidiary
from publishing the book, but the corporation declined to do SO. 29 The government,
in addition, considered taking legal action against Viking to restrain publication and
to seek an accounting of profits, but did not do So. 30 The government decided that
such an action would be unsuccessful given the first amendment and the presumption
against prior restraint in the United States. 31
On June 2 the Vice-Chancellor dismissed the contempt of court charges against
the Independent and the other papers that had published summaries of Wright's
allegations. 32 The Attorney General appealed the decision. While this appeal was
pending, the editor of the Sunday Times, who had obtained serialization rights of
Spycatcher from Heinemann, secretly arranged with Viking to obtain a copy of the
manuscript so that he could publish excerpts of the book to coincide with its
publication in the United States. 33 In order to avoid government detection and to
insure that at least some of the Wright material would be published, the Sunday Times
did not include any of it in the first edition but saved the excerpts for the second
edition of the paper, published on the evening of July 12. 3 4 The Attorney General,
therefore, had to wait until the next day to begin proceedings against the paper for
contempt of court and to obtain an injunction restraining further publication.35
24. See Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 816 (Ch. D.). The New
South Wales Court of Appeal upheld the court's decision. See Attorney-General (U.K.) v. Heinemann Publishers Austl.
Ltd. [1987] 10 N.S.W.L.R. 86. Special leave to appeal to the High Court was given, but Heinernann was allowed to
publish the book, and thus, on October 13, 1987, Spycatcher was available in Australia. In June of 1988 the High Court
dismissed the Attorney General's appeal. The court refused to grant jurisdiction to enforce an obligation of confidence to
protect a foreign government's "intelligence secrets and confidential political information." See Attorney-General v.
Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776, 780 (H.L.(E.)) (per Lord Keith of Kinkel).
25. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 816-17 (Ch. D.).
26. Id. at 816.
27. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1255 (Ch. D.).
28. Id.
29. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 817 (Ch. D.).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1256 (Ch. D.).
33. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 817-18 (Ch. D.).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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On the very next day, July 14, 1987, Viking published Spycatcher in the United
States, where it immediately became a best seller. One New York bookseller,
claiming that the British were his "keenest" customers, ran out of copies by noon of
that day. 36 Prime Minister Thatcher, however, ruled out any attempts to stop
importation of the book, stating that such efforts were likely to be ineffective. 37 As
a result of that decision, British citizens were free to purchase copies of the book from
booksellers in the United States. One enterprising individual, claiming that the Prime
Minister would be proud of his initiative, flew to New York, purchased 80 copies of
Spycatcher, and, dressed as Uncle Sam, sold them in England. He was arrested, not
for importing the book, but for selling without a vendor's license. 38
Meanwhile, the Attorney General's appeal of the contempt of court dismissals
was decided with the Court of Appeal's holding that any further publication of the
Wright material would constitute contempt of court. 39 As a result of that decision, the
Sunday Times appealed to the European Commission of Human Rights, and that case
is still pending. 4° Because the contempt of court case had been decided, The
Guardian and Observer renewed their application to have the injunction against them
dismissed.4 1 That action, joined by the Sunday Times, was heard on July 20 with the
Vice-Chancellor dismissing the injunction. 42 The Attorney General appealed that
decision, and the Court of Appeal reversed the Vice-Chancellor's decision on July
24. 4 3 The newspapers then appealed to the House of Lords, which upheld the Court
of Appeal's decision and, in addition, modified the injunction to prohibit publication
of any Wright material disclosed in open court in Australia. 44
During this time period, the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong, The
Dominion in New Zealand, and the Nation in East Africa all published serialized
excerpts from Spycatcher. The Attorney General obtained a temporary injunction
restraining the first two papers from publishing further excerpts of the book.45 In
November of 1987 the injunction against the New Zealand paper was dismissed with
the court refusing to grant a temporary injunction pending appeal of its decision. 46
36. The Guardian, July 15, 1987, at 1, col. 3. As of October of 1987, Viking Penguin had printed 715,000 copies
of Spycatcher, and from August to October, the book was listed as a best seller for nine weeks. Similar sales occurred
in Canada. As of August of 1987, there were estimates that 10,000 copies of Spycatcher were entering England each
week. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 820-21 (Ch. D.).
37. The Guardian, July 15, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
38. The Guardian, July 28, 1987, at 30, col. 6.
39. Attorney-General v. Newspaper Publishing Plc. [1987] 3 W.L.R. 942, 958 (C.A.).
40. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 818 (Ch. D.).
41. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1255 (Ch. D.).
42. Id. at 1257.
43. Id. at 1271-82.
44. Id. at 1282-1321.
45. See Attorney-General v. South China Morning Post Ltd., No. 114 (Civil) Sept. 8, 1987; Attorney-General v.
South China Morning Post Ltd., No. 4644 (HC) Aug. 24, 1987 (on file at the Ohio State Law Journal). In addition, the
British government obtained a temporary injunction against serialization of the book by The Dominion, the main daily
newspaper in Wellington, New Zealand. The Guardian, Aug. 5, 1987, at 1, col. 8. As of August 25, 1987, the
government had not decided whether it would take similar action against the Nation, East Africa's largest daily, which
also published abstracts. The Times, Aug. 25, 1987, at 16, col. 1.
46. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [19881 2 W.L.R. 805, 820 (Ch. D.). The New Zealand
Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision in April of 1988. Attorney-General v. Wellington Newspapers Ltd.
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In December of 1987 the trial on the main action occurred in England. The trial
court dismissed the injunction against the Observer, The Guardian, and the Sunday
Times, but the court held the Sunday Times liable for any profit that resulted from the
paper's publication of the Wright excerpts in July. 47 Both the Court of Appeal and
the House of Lords upheld the lower court's decision. 48 Thus, on October 13, 1988,
over two years after the Attorney General obtained the initial injunction, newspapers
in England were free to comment on the allegations made in Spycatcher.
In all of the Spycatcher cases, the British government relied on the common law
action of breach of confidence. The Attorney General argued that because Wright
owed a duty of confidence to the government, and the newspapers were aware of that
duty, they too were bound by his obligation of confidence. Thus, their publication of
any material Wright disclosed in breach of his duty to the government was a breach
of their own duty. Once the Attorney General was successful in obtaining an
injunction against the Observer and The Guardian, he argued that any further
publication of the Wright material would destroy the subject matter of his suit against
those papers, and, thus, constituted contempt of court. In order to place in perspective
the approach used by the Attorney General, a brief overview of the law of confidence
and the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act is necessary.
II. REsTRAiNTs ON THE PRESS
A. Breach of Confidence
A 16th-century verse concerning the Chancellor's power states:
These three give place in court of conscience,
Fraud, accident, and breach of confidence. 49
The rhyme reflects the long history of the law of confidence, and although earlier
cases have been reported, the Victorian period marks the foundation of the modem
action for breach of confidence. 50 The scope of the action is quite broad, covering
everything from trade and government secrets and artistic confidences to communi-
cations between spouses. 5' No current statute focuses exclusively on the law of
confidence, 52 but various statutes do include provisions that refer to confidential
information in connection with their own statutory purpose. 53 Section 87(5) of the
(unreported), Apr. 28, 1988 (noted in Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776, 790
(H.L.(E.))).
47. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 820 (Ch. D.).
48. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776 (H.L.(E)). These decisions,
however, did not end the legal battles over Spycatcher. Several newspapers published excerpts of the Wright material in
defiance of the earlier House of Lords decision, and the Attorney General had begun contempt proceedings against them.
The Guardian, Aug. 1, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
49. B. RED, CONFIDENTIArTY AND THE LAw 1 (1986) (quoting comment by Maitland in EQurry/Two CotusEs OF
LEcruRE 7 (1910)).
50. Id. at 7; see also F. GuRRY, BEACH OF CONFIDENCE 3 (1984).
51. F. GutuY, supra note 50, at 90-108.
52. But see LAw COMM'N, BRtacH OF CONFIDENCE, 1981, CZAND. No. 8388, at 179 [hereinafter BREACH OF
CONFIDENCE] (proposal for a statutory tort of breach of confidence).
53. B. REID, supra note 49, at 2; F. GURRY, supra note 50, at 237-38, 468-73.
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Food Act of 1984, for example, prohibits disclosure of any trade secrets obtained by
an inspector unless the disclosure is made in the performance of duty. 54 The law of
confidence, however, is predominantly judge-made rather than statutory.
The jurisdictional basis of the action is uncertain: courts have granted relief on
the basis of contract, property, and equity. 55 The theory used depends on the nature
of the information involved and the circumstances under which the information has
been disclosed.5 6 While this uncertainty does not affect the existence of the
jurisdiction, it may affect the remedy used in a particular case. 57
The modern formulation of the action is found in Saltman Engineering Co. v.
Campbell Engineering Co. 58 per Lord Greene: "If a defendant is proved to have used
confidential information, directly or indirectly obtained from a plaintiff, without
consent, express or implied, of the plaintiff, he will be guilty of an infringement of
the plaintiff's rights." 59 In order for a claim to be successful, the plaintiff must prove
three elements. First, the information itself must be confidential. 6° Second, the
information must have been given in circumstances that imposed an obligation of
confidence. 61 Third, there must be a breach of that obligation; the defendant must
have made unauthorized use of the information to the detriment of the plaintiff.62
For information to be confidential, it must not be public knowledge or public
property.63 A piece of information may, however, be available for anyone's use and
still be confidential: "what makes it confidential is the fact that the maker of the
document had used his brain and thus produced a result which can only be produced
by someone who goes through the same process.' '64 Information may also be public
knowledge in some locations and still be confidential in others. 65 Moreover, for
publication to destroy the confidentiality, all the details must be disclosed, 66 and even
if all details have been divulged, the context in which the disclosure occurred and the
association of the information to that context may still make the information
confidential. 67 A defendant may, for example, be restrained from using information
in the public domain if that information came to her in confidence and gives her an
unfair advantage over the plaintiff. 68
54. B. REID, supra note 49, at 2.
55. F. GuRRY, supra note 50, at 26; see also BREACH OF CONFIDENCE, supra note 52, at 3.1-5.2.
56. F. GuRRY, supra note 50, at 59.
57. BREACH OF CONFIDENCE, supra note 52, at 5.2 n.483; F. GuRRY, supra note 50, at 58-61.
58. [1963] 3 All E.R. 413.
59. Id. at 414.
60. Id. at 415; Coco v. A.N. Clark (Eng'rs) [1969] R.P.C. 41, 47.
61. Coco v. A.N. Clark (Eng'rs) [1969] R.P.C. 41, 47.
62. Id.
63. Saltman Eng'g Co. v. Campbell Eng'g Co. [1963] 3 All E.R. 413, 415.
64. Id.
65. See Franchi v. Franehi [1967] R.P.C. 149; ExchangeTel. Co. v. Central News Ltd. [1897] 2 Ch. 48; F. GuRRY,
supra note 50, at 74-75.
66. F. GuanY, supra note 50, at 74-75.
67. Id.
68. BRE.ACH OF CoN'mENcE, supra note 52, at 3.15. See also Schering Chem. Ltd. v. Falkman Ltd. [1982] 1 Q.B.
1, 2 (C.A.); Terrapin Ltd. v. Builders' Supply Co. [1967] R.P.C. 41; Exchange Tel. Co. v. Central News Ltd. [1897]
2 Ch. 48.
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The circumstances under which an obligation of confidence arises will vary.
While an obligation may arise out of a contractual relationship-either express or
implied-a contract is not required.6 9 The key is whether the information was
disclosed to the confidant for a limited purpose and if so, whether the confidant was
aware of the limitations on the use of the information. 70 The test of whether the
confidant knew of the limitations is not clear,71 but Judge Megarry in Coco v. A.N.
Clark (Engineers)72 used a reasonableness test to imply an obligation in equity:
It seems to me that if the circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing in the
shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised that upon reasonable grounds
the information was being given to him in confidence, then this should suffice to impose
upon him the equitable obligation of confidence.73
In some cases the limited use restriction will be clear from the circumstances
surrounding the disclosure, as in the case of an express contract or a statutory duty
of secrecy. In other instances, it may be implied from custom, on the basis of an
employment relationship, or implied by using a reasonable person test.74
If the plaintiff establishes that the information was confidential and that the
defendant was aware of it, then the plaintiff has to establish that the defendant
breached the obligation by making unauthorized use of the information. The question
is a factual one, and the court will look at whether the information used was directly
or indirectly obtained from the confider, and whether the use was inconsistent with
the purpose for which it was given.75
A plaintiff must prove the same elements when a third party discloses confidential
information, but this area of the law is uncertain. 76 It appears that if a third party has
actual knowledge of the confidential nature of the information at the time of receiving
it, she can be held liable for its disclosure if she stands to gain an advantage over the
plaintiff, or if she aids the confidant in his breach. 77 If, however, she lacks actual
knowledge and has no reason to know of the confidence, she will not be liable for its
disclosure.78 Furthermore, it is not clear whether an innocent third party who purchases
the information for value can be held liable. If she has not changed her position in
reliance on the information, some courts may, nevertheless, impose an obligation on
her if the plaintiff will be harmed by the breach, but other courts will not.79
69. See Seager v. Copydex Ltd. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923, 931 (C.A.) ("The law on this subject does not depend on
any implied contract. It depends on the broad principle of equity that he who has received information in confidence shall
not take unfair advantage of it."); F. GuRty, supra note 50, at 89-108.
70. F. GuRRY, supra note 50, at 113.
71. Id. at 115-20; BREACH OF CONFIDENCE, supra note 52, at 4.4.
72. [19691 R.P.C. 41.
73. Id. at 47.
74. F. GuRRY, supra note 50, at 120.
75. Id. at 256-57.
76. Id. at 270; BREACH OF CONFIDENCE, supra note 52, at 4.11-4.12, 6.52-6.55.
77. See F. GuRRY, supra note 50, at 271; BREACH OF CONFIDENCE, supra note 52, at 4.11. See also Schering Chem.
Ltd. v. Falkman Ltd. [ 1982] 1 Q.B. I (C.A.). In Schering the court granted an interlocutory injunction restraining Thames
Television, a third party, from broadcasting a television program because Thames used information knowing it came from
a confidant who breached his duty of confidence.
78. F. GURRY, supra note 50, at 275. See also Fraser v. Thames Television Ltd. [1984] 1 Q.B. 44, 65 (C.A.) ("in
order to be fixed with an obligation of confidence, a third party must know the information was confidential").
79. F. GuRRY, supra note 50, at 275-83.
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If the plaintiff establishes a cause of action for breach of confidence, whether it
be against someone with whom he has a direct relationship or a third party, the
defendant has several defenses at his disposal.8 0 The primary defense is that the
disclosure was made in the public interest. 81 The defense is outlined in Lion
Laboratories Ltd. v. Evans,82 in which Stephenson, L.J., relying on previous
decisions, 83 describes the factors considered. The court focuses on the two competing
interests involved: the public interest in preserving confidentiality and the counter-
vailing interest of the public in being informed of matters that are "of real public
concern." 8 4 If the information satisfies the requirements of public concern, individ-
uals or the press may have a duty to disclose the information even though they
obtained it unlawfully. 85
Courts consider four factors to determine matters of public concern. First, courts
note the "wide difference between what is interesting to the public and what is in the
public interest to make known." ' 86 The general public may, for example, be
interested in a piece of gossip about a member of the Royal family, but disclosure of
that information may not be in the public interest. Second, with respect to the press,
courts look at whether the "public interest" is, in fact, a private interest in increased
circulation. 87 Third, courts consider whether the public interest will be best served by
disclosure not to the public at large, but rather to the police or some other responsible
party.88 Fourth, courts have stated that there "is no confidence as to the disclosure of
iniquity.'"89
What qualifies as iniquity is not certain. Lord Denning in Initial Services v.
Putteril190 stated that the defense should "extend to crimes, frauds and misdeeds,
both those actually committed as well as those in contemplation, provided always-
and this is essential-that the disclosure is justified in the public interest." 9 1
However, the defense has also been given a less restrictive definition when an actual
misdeed has not occurred. 92 In Lion Laboratories, for example, even though the
plaintiffs were not guilty of any misconduct, the court allowed the defense because
the information was a matter of grave public concern. 93 Once the court has examined
80. See BR.AcH OF Co''DtENcE, supra note 52, at 4.54-4.72; F. GuRPY, supra note 50, at 325-59; B. RFm, supra
note 49, at 176-77.
81. See F. GwuRY, supra note 50, at 325-52; BREAcH OF COWJFIDENCE, supra note 52, at 4.36-4.53.
82. [19851 1 Q.B. 526, 536-39 (C.A.).
83. Schering Chem. Ltd. v. Falkman Ltd. [1982] 1 Q.B. 1 (C.A.); British Steel Corp. v. Granada Tel. Ltd. [1981]
A.C. 1096; Woodward v. Hutchins [1977] 1 W.L.R. 760 (C.A.); Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 Q.B. 84 (C.A.); Fraser
v. Evans [1969] 1 Q.B. 349 (C.A.); Initial Servs. Ltd. v. Putterill [1968] 1 Q.B. 396 (C.A.).
84. Lion Lab. Ltd. v. Evans [1985] 1 Q.B. 526, 536 (C.A.).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 537 (quoting Lord Wilberforce in British Steel Corp. v. Granada Tel. Ltd. [1981] A.C. 1096, 1168).
87. Id. See also Francome v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [1984] 1 W.L.R. 892, 898 (C.A.) ("[T]hey are
peculiarly vulnerable to the error of confusing the public interest with their own.") (per Donaldson, M.R.).
88. Lion Lab. Ltd. v. Evans [ 1985] 1 Q.B. 526, 537 (C.A.). See also Francome v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd.
11984] 1 W.L.R. 892, 898 (C.A.).
89. Gartside v. Outram [1856] 26 L.J. Ch. 113, 114; Lion Lab. Ltd. v. Evans [1985] 1 Q.B. 526, 537 (C.A.).
90. [1968] 1 Q.B. 396 (C.A.).
91. Id. at 405.
92. See Lion Lab. Ltd. v. Evans [1985] 1 Q.B. 526, 537 (C.A.); F. GUtRY, supra note 50, at 340-41.
93. The information in that case dealt with faulty breathalyzers by which some members of the public may have
been wrongly convicted for drunk driving.
1989]
414 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:405
the above factors, it weighs the competing interests based on the evidence and facts
of the case.
The law of breach of confidence is fact-based, and the success of a claim
depends upon the relationship of the parties involved, the nature of the information,
and the extent to which the information is already available to the public. While most
cases arise from disclosure of trade secrets, patents, or employment contracts, 94 a
number of cases have involved the press. 95 With the exception of Lord Denning's
dissent in Schering Chemicals Ltd. v. Falkman Ltd. ,96 nothing suggests that the press
is given any greater protection from a breach of confidence action than any other
defendant. Moreover, despite Blackstone's commentary on prior restraint, 97 the
courts have not been reluctant to grant temporary injunctions restraining the press
from publishing confidential material. 98 Courts weigh the same factors in granting
any injunction: the adequacy of damages, the likelihood that one party will be greatly
harmed as a result of the grant or denial of the injunction, and each party's likelihood
of prevailing at trial. 99
B. The Contempt of Court Act 1981
The press, in addition to being subject to actions for breach of confidence, is also
subject to the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (the Act). °0 The Act provides for strict
liability if a publication creates a substantial risk that the course of justice will be
seriously impeded or prejudiced. '0 ' In order for the strict liability rule to apply, the
proceedings in question must be active. ' 0 2
Criminal proceedings are active at the time of an arrest without a warrant, the
issuance of a warrant or a summons, or the service of an indictment, whichever
comes first.103 Other proceedings become active at the time arrangements are made
for the hearing or, if no such arrangements are made, from the time the trial begins. 104
Appellate proceedings are active when they are commenced by the appropriate
94. See generally F. GutRY, supra note 50; B. REm, supra note 49.
95. See Lion Lab. Ltd. v. Evans [1985] 1 Q.B. 526 (C.A.); Francome v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [1984]
1 W.L.R. 892 (C.A.); Schering Chem. Ltd. v. Falkman Ltd. [1982] 1 Q.B. 1 (C.A.); Home Office v. Hannan [1981]
I Q.B. 534 (Q.B.D.); British Steel Corp. v. Granada Tel. Ltd. [1981] A.C. 1096; Attorney-General v. Jonathan Cape
Ltd. [1976] 1 Q.B. 752; Fraser v. Evans [1969] 1 Q.B. 349 (C.A.); Argyll (Duchess of) v. Argyll (Duke of) [19671 Ch.
302.
96. [1982] 1 Q.B. 1, 22 (C.A.) ("Freedom of the press is of fundamental importance in our society. It covers not
only the right of the press to impart information of general concern, but also the right of the public to receive it. It is not
to be restricted on the ground of breach of confidence unless there is a 'pressing social need' for such restraint.").
97. "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous
restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published." 4 W. BLAcsrors,
COmsNTARiEs 151-52.
98. See Recent Developments, Freedom of the Press and Government Secrets: The Availability of Prior Restraint
Against the Press in the United Kingdom, 28 HARv. Ir'L L.J. 131, 133 (1987) (authored by Paula Dalley) [hereinafter
Dalley].
99. Id. See also American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] 2 W.L.R. 316 (H.L.(E.)).
100. [1981] Ch. 49.
101. Id. § 2(2).
102. Id. § 2(3).
103. Id. sched. 1., 4-5.
104. Id. 12.
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procedures. 05 All proceedings become inactive when they are disposed of or are
discontinued. 106
There is, then, a three-part test for the strict liability rule to apply. The
proceedings must be active. If they are, then the Attorney General 07 must prove that
there is a substantial risk that publication will affect the proceedings. This seems to
be determined by the nature of the publication, its breadth, and the place of trial. 0 8
Then the Attorney General must prove that the publication will seriously impede or
prejudice the proceeding. This determination depends on the content of the
publication and its proximity to the date of trial. 09
A defendant has four possible defenses. First, a publisher who does not know
and has no reason to know that the proceedings are active cannot be convicted under
the rule.' 10 Second, a distributor who does not know or does not have reason to
suspect that the publication contains prejudicial information cannot be held liable.I"I
Third, a publication made as part of a good faith discussion of public affairs or other
matters of public interest does not fall under the rule if the risk of prejudice is
incidental." 2 Fourth, fair and accurate reports of public proceedings published
contemporaneously and in good faith are not subject to the rule. The latter, however,
can be postponed if the court thinks that it is necessary to avoid the risk of
prejudice. 13
Despite the limits on strict liability, the Act contains a savings provision that
allows for common law defenses as well as for other kinds of actions for contempt. 14
Thus the press could be restrained from publishing information even if the
proceedings were not active, if a court believed that the information published would
impede justice. If, for example, in a child abuse case, the court believed that
disclosing the child's name would be harmful to her, the court could prohibit its
disclosure even if the proceedings involved were not active.
The freedom of the press in England is limited by each of the means outlined,
and nothing suggests that either the government or the courts are hesitant about
imposing restraints. The government, as the Spycatcher cases illustrate, combines
these methods quite effectively to delay publication of information it believes should
remain secret.
105. Id. T 15.
106. Id. 5, 12, 15-16.
107. Id. § 7. Section 7 requires the consent of the Attorney General or a motion of the court for an action to be
brought under the rule.
108. See Attorney-General v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [1986] 3 W.L.R. 365, 375, 377 (C.A.).
109. Id. at 377.
110. Contempt of Court Act 1981, Ch. 49, § 3(1).
111. Id. § 3(2).
112. Id. § 5.
113. Id.§4.
114. Id. § 6.
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HI. THE ENGLISH CASES
A. The Breach of Confidence Actions
1. The Pre-Publication Cases
The British cases began on June 27, 1986, when Justice MacPherson granted an
ex parte injunction restraining The Guardian and Observer from disclosing any
information obtained by Wright and from publishing any information connected to
Spycatcher.115 Justice Millett modified the injunction to restrain the papers: (1) from
publishing any information directly or indirectly obtained from Wright in his capacity
as a member of the Service, and (2) from attributing any information concerning the
Service to Wright by name or otherwise. 116 The papers, however, were free to publish
information already made public in works published by Chapman Pincher or
broadcast on programs by Granada television." 7 The papers could, in addition,
publish information disclosed in open court in New South Wales. 118 The Court of
Appeal upheld the injunction in a modified form allowing for disclosure of
information discussed in open Parliament. 119
On appeal, the Attorney General relied on the affidavit filed by Sir Robert
Armstrong 2t in the Australian proceeding and on the common law action for breach
of confidence. The Attorney General argued that because Wright's disclosure was a
breach of his duty of confidence, the information itself was tainted by that breach.
Any publication of that information by the newspapers, given their knowledge of its
tainted nature, was a continuing breach of Wright's obligation to the government.12 '
The newspapers, in essence, were third parties who, by virtue of their awareness of
the confidential nature of the information, were in the same position as Wright: they,
like Wright, were the confidants who had been given information for a limited use
and, therefore, could not make any unauthorized disclosure of it. 122
The Attorney General's primary argument was based on Sir Robert's affidavit.
In the affidavit, Sir Robert pointed out the "exceptional scope" of the obligation
accepted by Wright and other Service members. 123 Wright had had access to highly
classified information, information Sir Robert claimed was still highly sensitive.124
Sir Robert then outlined the dangers that would result, claiming that any disclosure
would endanger the work of the Service and, thereby, the national security interests
of the United Kingdom. '2 Sir Robert also stated that while the information itself may
115. Attorney-General v. Observer Ltd. (C.A. July 25, 1986) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
116. Id.
117. See supra note 8. These works are among those that had earlier disclosed information similar to that disclosed
by Wright.
118. Attorney-General v. Observer Ltd. (C.A. July 25, 1986) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
119. Id. (The decision was unanimous, with Mustill, L.J. and Nourse, L.J. concurring in the Master ofRolls opinion.)
120. Id. Sir Robert is the Prime Minister's principal advisor on matters of security and intelligence.
121. Id.
122. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
123. Attorney-General v. Observer Ltd. (C.A. July 25, 1986) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
124. Id.
125. Id. Sir Robert delineated three areas of potential damage:
[Vol. 50:405
1989] THE SPYCATCHER CASES 417
not have been classified, and may seem innocuous, its disclosure could cause serious
harm to the Service. 126 It could take on added significance when read in tandem with
other information, allowing unfriendly governments to verify their sources. 127
The press argued that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the security
interest and asserted an additional public interest in exposing wrongdoing by the
Service. The Service, they argued, was subject to the same laws as any ordinary
citizen. The public, therefore, had a legitimate "interest in knowing of, and being
able to bring pressure to bear to restrain, any breach by it of the law.' 2 8 The
newspapers also argued that because the information had already been made public
without any actions taken by the government, its confidentiality was destroyed. 129
Sir John Donaldson, Master of the Rolls, after acknowledging that damages
would be an inadequate remedy for either party, turned to the balancing test
established in Lion Laboratories:130 "The conflict should be resolved in favour of
restraint, unless the court is satisfied that there is a serious defence of public interest
which may succeed at trial ... and that that interest outweighs the conflicting public
interest in favour of preserving confidentiality.1 131 In weighing the competing public
interests, he concluded that the balance tipped in favor of protecting the obligation of
confidence and national security. 132 He rejected the papers' defense of iniquity,
pointing out that they had not sought to communicate the Service's alleged
wrongdoing to those in authority to investigate, but rather to the largest possible
audience-the public. 133
The Master of the Rolls also rejected the defense of prior publication. The papers
had relied on the decision of 0. Mustad & Son v. Dosen, 134 in which the court held
that if a plaintiff were responsible for information becoming public knowledge, he
could not assert a claim of confidence.135 The Master of the Rolls distinguished this
case by stating that the government had not authorized the previous publications and
thus was not responsible for the disclosures. 136 Moreover, he pointed out that to
accept this claim would allow the papers to profit from their wrongdoing. 137
The Court of Appeal's decision at this stage of the litigation is not surprising.
The Attorney General had an arguable claim of breach of confidence by a third party,
a) the intelligence and security services of friendly foreign countries with which the British Security Service is
in liaison would be likely to lose confidence in its ability to protect classified information; b) the British Security
Service depends upon the confidence of other organizations and persons. That confidence would suffer serious
damage should the Second Defendant [Wright] reveal information of the nature described above; c) there would
be risk that other persons who are or have been employed in the British Security Service who have had access
to similar information might seek to publish it. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. [19851 1 Q.B. 526 (C.A.). See also supra text accompanying notes 81-93.
131. Attorney-General v. Observer Ltd. (C.A. July 25, 1986) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. [19631 R.P.C. 41.
135. Attorney-General v. Observer Ltd. (C.A. July 25, 1986) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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a claim sufficient at least to put the court in the position of balancing the competing
interests involved. Once that occurred, the nature of the information became the
controlling factor, and because the full contents of Spycatcher were not available or
known, the Attorney General had an arguable claim that the information could harm
the Service. Thus, the court's application of the balancing test was not unusual.
What is surprising, however, is the ease with which the court rejected the
papers' iniquity defense and its trust in the very authorities to whom Wright had
appealed prior to deciding to publish the book.'3 8 It may be that the court was
persuaded by Sir Robert's affidavit, especially because at this time the only
information disclosed was the papers' allegations and information made public
previously. That all changed, however, once Spycatcher became available not only
in England, but worldwide.
2. The Post-Publication Cases
The post-publication cases are really three phases of the same case, that is, The
Guardian and Observer's attempt to have the Millett injunction dismissed, and the
Attorney General's attempt to keep it in force. Each decision of the courts, however,
develops a different approach to the issues involved, and for this reason, the decisions
will be dealt with separately.
a. Chancery Division
In their claim for dismissal, the Observer and The Guardian contended that a
material change in circumstances had occurred since the granting of the initial
injunction. These papers argued that the publication of Spycatcher in the United
States and its availability in England, combined with other press disclosures,
weakened the Attorney General's claim for breach of confidence. 139 The papers
argued that for any claim of breach of confidence to succeed, the information must
remain confidential; once it was in the public domain, it no longer had the "quality
of confidence." 140 Thus, the Attorney General no longer had an arguable case at
trial, and the injunction should be lifted.'14
The Attorney General claimed that no material change in circumstances had
occurred. He pointed out that the injunction was still temporary; the appeal on it had
not yet been decided by the House of Lords, nor had the Australian action been
determined; and, he stated, the concerns expressed in Sir Robert's affidavit remained
the same. 142 He also argued that the availability of the information to the public was
not determinative. He relied on the distinction between information imparted in
confidence before publication and after publication. The Attorney General claimed
138. See Dalley, supra note 98, at 137 (pointing out the court's faith in the "ability and inclination of the
government to correct its own wrongdoing without demands from the press and public").
139. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1261 (Ch. D.).
140. Id. The reference is to Saltman Eng'g Co. v. Campbell Eng'g Co. [1963] 3 All E.R. 413,415. See also supra
text accompanying notes 63-68.
141. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1261 (Ch. D.).
142. Id. at 1257.
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that if the information were not confidential prior to its communication, then no
injunction could issue. If it were confidential when disclosed, then a later publication
would not destroy the obligation of confidence. 143 That, he claimed, was the case
here: the information acquired by Wright was confidential, and its later disclosure did
not change Wright's duty or the confidential nature of the information. 14 4
Anyone who obtained the information with notice of the fact that it was
communicated in confidence came under the same obligation as Wright, whether or
not it was still confidential at the time he obtained it. 145 The papers, then, were still
under the same obligation of confidence as they were prior to publication of
Spycatcher.
In the first part of his decision, the Vice-Chancellor accepted the newspapers'
argument that there had been a material change in circumstances. 146 He pointed out
that the publication of the book undermined the basis of the Millett injunction: "the
injunction no longer preserves a position in which it can be said that the British
Security Service is leak-proof; the various matters which Sir Robert Armstrong
deposed to in his affidavit are now known." 147 The Vice-Chancellor's task, then, was
to determine if the Attorney General still had an arguable case at trial.
148
In making that decision, the Vice-Chancellor first rejected the papers' argument
as too simplistic. He then pointed out the weakness of the Attorney General's version
of third party liability for breach of confidence. The Vice-Chancellor distinguished
between parties who participate in the breach and those who do not. 149 Thus, between
a confider and confidant, the obligation of confidence remained, regardless of whether
the information was in the public domain. A publisher who participated in the breach
of an employee's contract by, for example, "poaching" information was bound by
the obligation attached to the confidant.150 If, however, a third party who had not
participated in the breach obtained the same information, and at the time he received
it the information was public knowledge, then he would not be bound by the obligation
of confidence. Once the information was public, the third party had a right to it. 
1
1
The Vice-Chancellor placed Wright and his publisher, Heinemann, in the first
category and the Observer and The Guardian in the second. The newspapers could
purchase a copy of Spycatcher, disclose its contents, and not be in breach of
confidence because they had not assisted Wright in his breach of duty. 152 The
143. Id. at 1262. The Attorney General relied on the decisions in Speed Seal Prod. Ltd. v. Paddington [1985] 1
W.L.R. 1327 (C.A.) (when defendant who owed a duty of confidence publishes the information, an injunction will still
lie even if information is available to the public) and Schering Chem. Ltd. v. Falkman Ltd. [ 1982] 1 Q.B. 1 (C.A.) (when
third party participates in breach of confidence, an obligation to keep the confidence still exists even if the information
is available from other sources).
144. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [19871 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1262 (Ch. D.).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1259.
147. Id. at 1261.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1263-65.
150. Id. at 1264.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1265.
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information, in their case, was public: it no longer belonged to the government
because it was in the public domain. 153
The Vice-Chancellor also pointed out that the Attorney General's theory
expanded the law of confidence and could lead to absurd results.1 54 Under the
Attorney General's theory, if a person purchased a copy of Spycatcher and read it,
she could not, for example, disclose the contents to her husband without breaking the
law. 155 However, because the Attorney General raised an arguable point of law, the
Vice-Chancellor did not decide the case based on third party liability, 156 but decided
he was bound to balance the competing interests. 157
In favor of granting an injunction, the Vice-Chancellor pointed to its temporary
nature and to the fact that all papers would be bound by it. 158 He also noted that
allowing publication would be admitting that the courts could not protect state secrets
and could lead others to emulate Wright. 159 The balance, however, fell on the side of
the papers. The Vice-Chancellor focused on three points. First, the publication of
Spycatcher defeated the purpose of the injunction. Any harm that could occur,
already had. Second, given that the information was available, an injunction would
act as an unnecessary restraint on the press. Third, he held that the public interest
required that the courts be respected, and that to uphold an injunction whose purpose
was defeated would make the law "an ass." 160
A sense of reluctance runs through the Vice-Chancellor's opinion. 161 On the one
hand, he expressed a concern over the danger of future publications like Wright's, but
on the other, he realized the futility of preventing publications given the contempo-
rary world of electronics and limited jurisdictions. 162 His opinion, however, also
showed concern for the freedom of the press. He acknowledged that publication by
the press would cause greater damage than that done by an individual, but stated that
to restrain the press on this basis negated freedom of the press: "If the press is
precluded from saying things that other people are not precluded from, that seems to
be not a freedom of the press but an additional fetter on it." 163
b. The Court of Appeal
On appeal, the Attorney General focused on three points. He argued (1) that the
Vice-Chancellor's decision was inconsistent in that, having held the government had
an arguable case at trial, he failed to protect it; (2) that the effect of discharging the
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1266.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. See also American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. 11975] 2 W.L.R. 316, 321-22 (H.L.(E.)).
158. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1266 (Ch. D.). See infra text
accompanying notes 248-56.
159. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1268 (Ch. D.).
160. Id. at 1268-69.
161. Id. at 1269. He compares himself to the Dutch boy asked to place his finger in the hole of the dike when the
dam has already broken.
162. Id.
163. Id.
[Vol. 50:405
THE SPYCATCHER CASES
injunction would make any later remedy an empty gesture; and (3) that the
Vice-Chancellor failed to analyze what could be done by way of effective relief at that
stage of the litigation. 164
The Court of Appeal accepted the Attorney General's argument to a limited
extent. First, the court distinguished between information that was public knowledge
and information in the public domain. The contents of Spycatcher were public
knowledge, but because the book was tainted by Wright's breach of duty, it was not
in the public domain: the information still belonged to the government. 165 All
publications that came from it were also tainted. Thus, the court held that the
government's right to a temporary injunction had not changed since 1986.166
The court, however, accepted the lower court's view that equity does not act in
vain and, therefore, considered whether maintaining the injunction would be an
empty gesture. Relying once again on the affidavit of Sir Robert Armstrong, the court
decided that to maintain the full force of the injunction would be futile because much
of the harm he outlined had already occurred. 167 But a modified injunction could limit
some of the damage if Wright and others who were tempted to follow him were
prevented from profiting from their disclosures. 168 Because the United Kingdom was
the "best market" for Spycatcher, the court modified the injunction to prohibit
publication of any direct excerpt from the book or any statement from Wright. 169 In
order to protect the freedom of the press and avoid public inconvenience and
impairment of discussion, the court allowed the papers to publish Wright's allega-
tions in very general terms.170 The court also modified the injunction to insure that
the press could not publish excerpts if the government lost its case in Australia. 17'
What is interesting about this decision is that it provides the government with
another possible vehicle for protecting its secrets. The court, in effect, accepted the
fact that the contents of Spycatcher were public knowledge, and yet it maintained,
albeit in a modified form, an injunction not on the basis of breach of confidence, but
on a deterrence theory. The injunction's purpose was not to protect against further
disclosures, but to prevent Wright from profiting from them. While this would not be
unusual in terms of the law of confidence as applied to the confidant, it is unusual
when applied to third parties who have neither aided nor participated in the breach.
It may be that the decision was directed to the Sunday Times and its attempt to escape
detection by the government, but if so, the opinions do not make this clear. Under the
reasoning of this case, the government conceivably could prevent information,
regardless of how widely disseminated, from being published because it could lead
others to do the same or allow the original confidant to profit. It does not appear to
matter whether those interested in disclosing the information participated in the
164. Id. at 1274.
165. Id. at 1275-76.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1276.
168. Id. at 1277.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1277-78.
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original breach. If that is the case, and this opinion suggests that it is, the action
would no longer be one for breach of confidence but one for deterrence.
c. The House of Lords
The House of Lords, by a three-to-two decision, overruled the lower court
decisions and reinstated the Millett injunction with an added proviso prohibiting the
press from publishing disclosures made in open court in Australia. 172 All parties
agreed that the modified injunction was unworkable 73 and that the issue had to be
resolved by either dismissing or maintaining the injunction.
In his opinion, Lord Brandon, initially pointed out that the Attorney General was
not enforcing a private right that would normally be overridden by the public interest
in the freedom of expression, but rather, that the Attorney General was acting to
protect the public interest of the Security Service. 174 The press's interest in
publication was subordinate to that of the Service. 175 Lord Brandon also noted that
the injunction was temporary 176 and that the government had a strong case prior to
Spycatcher's publication. 177
The key issue, then, was whether the strength of that claim had been sufficiently
diminished by subsequent events to require the injunction's dismissal. 78 In deciding
that the claim was not weakened, Lord Brandon focused on two points. First, he
rejected the notion that the contents of the book were public knowledge, stating that
if they had been, the press would not have been as determined to publish as they
were. 179 He then turned to the question of harm to the Service, and while he agreed
that many of the harms outlined by Sir Robert had already occurred,180 the potential
damage to the Service had not been exhausted. There still remained the risk of future
disclosures,' 8' and that risk, he stated, was a real one, leaving the government with
an arguable claim at trial. 182
Lord Brandon concluded that the best way to resolve the issue was to have a full
trial with both sides presenting evidence.183 If the injunction were dismissed at this
stage, the government's case would be destroyed by publication, 184 but if it were
continued, the only harm to the press was delay, an effect that was not equivalent to
the complete denial of a trial. 85 The choice, as he saw it, lay between one course
resulting in irrevocable damage, and the other resulting only in a temporary delay.
172. Id. at 1282.
173. See, e.g., id. at 1313. Lord Oliver pointed out that it would offer no protection to the Attorney General and
would place the press in the awkward position of trying to interpret "general terms."
174. Id. at 1287-88.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1289.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1290. See also supra note 125.
181. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1290 (H.L.(E.)).
182. Id. at 1290-91.
183. Id. at 1291.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1292.
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The latter, he held, was preferable to the former, especially given the importance of
the public issue involved.18 6
Lord Templeman approached the case from the perspective of Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (Article 10).187 In his analysis he accepted
that Wright's publication of Spycatcher was a treacherous breach of duty. He also
accepted the Attorney General's argument that the obligation of confidence applied
to the press and anyone else receiving information from Wright with knowledge of its
confidential nature.1 88 The press's actions, therefore, were not protected by Article
10 because while that provision guaranteed freedom of expression, it allowed
governments to interfere with that right in the interest of national security.1 89 The
issue, then, was whether the injunction was necessary to preserve national
security. 190
Lord Templeman decided that a democracy could prevent members of a security
service from disclosing secrets and could prevent others from repeating them. 191 He
agreed with the newspapers that the members of the Service were not above the law,
but held that those who were aware of violations could freely report them to the
appropriate authorities. 192 The press, moreover, was free to investigate allegations of
wrongdoing and report their results as long as they did not publish information
wrongly disclosed by Wright. 193
Lord Templeman then turned his focus to Article 10, relying on three reasons
why the injunction was justified. First, he pointed out that because members of the
Service are sworn to secrecy, they must rely on the Attorney General to protect their
interests by preventing mass circulation of accusations and revelations of the
Service's activities.1 94 If the press were allowed to publish Wright's allegations, the
Service and its members would be subject to harassment and would be unable to
defend themselves. This in turn, he stated, would "deal a blow to the morale" of the
Service and could lead to a loss of public confidence in the Service. 95 Lord
Templeman rejected the papers' counterargument that the law would look ridiculous
if it imposed restraints on the press when others could purchase copies of the book. 196
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1296. That Article in pertinent part states:
1. Everyone has the right of freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority .... 2. The exercise of these
freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions...
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security. ... for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary.
CO,-ErrlON FOR THE PROTECnON OF HurtAN RIoTrrs AND FtNmArer. FPxasoOts (Rome, 4 Nov. 1950) ART. 10, quoted
in Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1296 (H.L.(E.)).
188. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1294-95 (H.L.(E.)).
189. Id. at 1297.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1297-98.
194. Id. at 1298.
195. Id.
196. Id. This is a reference to the Vice-Chancellor's opinion. See supra text accompanying note 160.
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Second, he stated that if the injunction were dismissed, others could follow Wright's
example by first publishing their memoirs abroad. 197 Moreover, if the court held the
injunction served no purpose, Wright could continue to publish additional allega-
tions, and nothing would prevent the British press from publishing them as well. 198
Finally, he stated that to allow publication would be to surrender to the press "an
untrammelled, arbitrary and irresponsible power to evade an order of the court," an
order designed to protect the safety of the realm.' 99
Lord Ackner provided an overview of the issues already raised200 and then
focused on the fact that it would be a denial of justice to dismiss the injunction before
the initial action was heard. Stressing the potential harms to the Service and the
importance of the public interest in deterring others, 20 1 he argued that if the Attorney
General were denied a trial, Wright could publish his work in England, and more
importantly, members of the Service and their families would not be protected from
other disclosures.202 The press's publication, then, would not only affect the morale
of the Service, but it would also cause a further loss of confidence in the efficiency
of the Service. That interest justified the maintenance of the injunction until trial. 203
Lord Ackner also emphasized that a dismissal would undermine British
justice.20 4 He concluded by pointing out that the added proviso to prevent disclosures
made in open court in Australia was necessary to keep the press from publishing
excerpts of Wright's book.20 5 It would have been naive and absurd, he stated, for the
Lords not to have anticipated the press's use of this loophole to frustrate the court's
order.206
Lord Oliver, in his dissent, focused on the inappropriateness and ineffectiveness
of continuing the injunction given the events that had occurred. He stated that it had
to be remembered that the parties involved were the Observer and The Guardian,
newspapers that had done and were proposing to do nothing more than what any
paper would do: collect and disseminate the news to the public.20 7 The issue then was
whether it made sense to restrain those papers from publishing information freely
obtainable by the public and the press in all countries except England. 20 8 He
concluded that it did not.
First, Lord Oliver argued that it was a misuse of the injunctive remedy to restrain
the papers in order to deter others, especially when they had not been party to the
breach.2 9 Second, it was inefficient, given that the case itself demonstrated that an
197. Id. at 1299.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 175-84. Lord Ackner also accepted Lord Templeman's opinion on Article
10 and held that an accounting of profits would be useless given the jurisdictional problems.
201. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1305 (H.L.(E.)).
202. Id. at 1305-06.
203. Id. at 1306.
204. See supra text accompanying note 1.
205. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1308-09 (H.L.(E.)).
206. Id. at 1309.
207. Id. at 1315.
208. Id. at 1316.
209. Id. at 1317-18.
[Vol. 50:405
THE SPYCATCHER CASES
injunction could not prevent publication. 210 Third, the harm to the Service had
already occurred, and other measures, such as an accounting of profits, could have
been used to protect its morale. 21 ' Moreover, the widespread availability of the book
illustrated that the Service's morale would continue to be harmed. Restraint would
not stop it. He argued that the contention of continuing harm to the Service would
have been valid if the information had indeed been cut off, but it lost all force and was
of little value given the level of publicity. 21 2
Next Lord Oliver considered the Attorney General's claim of breach of
confidence against third parties. 2 13 While he accepted that the Attorney General may
have had an arguable case, he found it difficult to believe that it would be successful
at trial. 214 He did not believe that the papers would be permanently enjoined from
disclosing information that had been and still was being disclosed by members of the
public. Moreover, given the papers' iniquity defense, he argued that it was
impossible to try the case without disclosing the allegations. Would the court, he
asked, have to try the case in the privacy of its chambers to prevent disclosing not
state secrets, but information the public already had?21 5 Given all of the above, the
balance, he held, must fall to the press. Lord Oliver acknowledged that the freedom
of the press was limited, but if that privilege which is at the "root of society" were
to be overborne, it "must be overborne to some purpose. "216
Lord Bridge, also dissenting, considered whether there was a remaining national
security interest the Millett injunction could protect and, if so, whether it was of
sufficient weight to justify the "massive encroachment" on the freedom of the
press. 217 In deciding that no security interest remained, he pointed out that the state's
claim had been defeated by publication-the deterrence theory carried little weight
once it was clear that the information could not be contained-and if the Attorney
General were concerned about disclosure of future allegations, he could seek
injunctions when such disclosures occurred. 218 Given the weakness of the claim
against the papers, Lord Bridge argued that the interference with the freedom of the
press was not justified. In pointing out that the modified injunction may have been
aimed at the Sunday Times, he stated that if there were a legal means to restrain that
paper, he would allow it. But to prevent the press from discussing matters of interest
to the public was not acceptable:
Freedom of speech is always the first casualty under a totalitarian regime. Such a regime
cannot afford to allow the free circulation of information and ideas among its citizens....
The present attempt to insulate the public in this country from information which is freely
available elsewhere is a significant step down that very dangerous road. The maintenance of
210. Id. at 1317.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1318. See supra text accompanying notes 143-45.
214. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1319-20 (H.L.(E.)).
215. Id. at 1320.
216. Id. at 1320-21.
217. Id. at 1285.
218. Id. at 1285-86.
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the ban, as more and more copies of the book Spycatcher enter this country and circulate
here, will seem more and more ridiculous.219
The House of Lords' decision illustrates the relatively low value placed on the
freedom of the press in England and represents a potential expansion of the law of
breach of confidence. The majority opinions are based on the assumption that further
publication by the press would result in harm to the Service. That harm, they claimed,
was not in the disclosure of classified secrets, but rather in subjecting its members to
harassment when others emulate Wright in the future. The majority's reasoning
assumes that others will be eager to follow Wright's example, that the procedures
established by the Service to prevent leaks will fail again, and that actions for
accounting of profits are useless. Thus, they assume that the only means to deter
others is to restrain the press in this instance as a lesson for the future.
The weakness in the Lords' reasoning is apparent from the facts of the
Spycatcher cases themselves. The potential harms the Lords mentioned had already
occurred. Wright's book and all of his allegations were public knowledge regardless
of how the term is defined. Only the press was prevented from discussing the book.
Moreover, given this decision, the only restraint on future Wrights is a restraint on the
press. Such people will still be free to publish their memoirs abroad, the public will
still be free to purchase them, and the writers will still profit from their disclosures.
Only the press suffers. The deterrent effect, then, is minimal, but the Lords, by
attempting to prevent something that cannot be prevented by an injunction, have in
the process expanded the law of confidence.
While the Lords decided only that the Attorney General had an arguable claim
at trial, the majority opinions seem to suggest that a third party can be held liable for
breach of confidence even though he did not participate in the original breach. That
liability, it would appear, continues regardless of how widespread the disclosure has
been. In cases up to this point, as the Vice-Chancellor outlined in his decision, courts
imposed liability only when the third party aided the breach and stood to profit by
it.22° If the Attorney General's version of the law is accurate, potential claims existed
against the general public for reading Spycatcher and discussing it. Obviously such
claims would not have been brought, but the expansion of the law gives the
government an additional weapon to use against the press. The majority opinions also
seem to suggest that if the injunction had been lifted, Wright would have been free
to publish in England because an injunction would have served no purpose. 221 Here
it appears the Lords misinterpret the law. Up to this time, courts had held that unless
the plaintiff makes the information public, the confidant can be enjoined regardless
of whether or not the information is public knowledge. 222
Finally, the majority opinions suggests that an injunction for breach of
confidence can be brought on the basis of its deterrent effect even if the information
219. Id. at 1286.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 149-55.
221. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [19871 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1289, 1305 (H.L.(E.)).
222. See generally F. GuRRY, supra note 50.
[Vol. 50:405
THE SPYCATCHER CASES
involved has previously been disclosed. While the Lords distinguished between
information that is public knowledge and information that is in the public domain,2 23
in this case that distinction is of little use, given the scope of disclosure and the
government's concession that bans on importation of the book would have been
ineffective. It is not clear whether in future cases the government could restrain the
press from publishing an article, for example, about a leak at a chemical weapons
plant, not because the information was currently secret, but because it might lead
others to divulge information that is secret. The Lords' reasoning suggests that such
an action would be valid as long as the information had at one time been secret, and
its original disclosure was a violation of a duty of confidence.
The House of Lords' decision, then, has the potential of providing the
government with even wider means to restrain the press. Moreover, the government
needs to enjoin only one paper from publishing material. All other papers, and
perhaps anyone else who seeks to disclose the same information, will be prevented
from doing so because their action will be in contempt of court.
B. The Contempt of Court Proceedings
As noted earlier, after Justice Powell delivered his opinion in Australia, the
Independent and two other London papers published major summaries of Wright's
allegations, including direct quotations from Spycatcher.224 The Attorney General
brought proceedings against the papers for contempt of court. The courts, however,
decided only the preliminary question of whether a publication made with the
knowledge of an outstanding injunction against another party constituted criminal
contempt because it interfered with the administration of justice. 225
The Attorney General argued that it did. He distinguished between civil
contempt, which consists of a breach by a party of an order of the court, and criminal
contempt, which consists of conduct that frustrates or impedes the due administration
of justice. 226 He argued that the papers had not committed civil contempt because
they were not bound by the Millett injunction, but rather that they had committed
criminal contempt by publishing material the Court of Appeal had held was contrary
to public interest. 227 He claimed that if others published excerpts from Wright's
memoirs, they would destroy the very subject matter of the action against the
Observer and The Guardian: the confidentiality of the information. 22 8 Such publi-
cation would deprive the government of a right to a hearing on the main action, the
purpose of which was to obtain a permanent injunction to protect the secrecy of the
Service. 229 Thus the papers' action interfered with the administration of justice.
The newspapers argued that they could not be bound by an injunction to which
223. See Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1289 (H.L.(E.)).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
225. Attorney-General v. Newspapers Publishing Plc. [1987] 3 W.L.R. 942, 949 (Ch. D.).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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they were not a party. 230 To hold third parties bound to an order, they argued, would
be contrary to the principle of English law that courts decide only issues between the
parties before them and make orders that bind only those parties. 231 Further, they
claimed that to hold them in contempt would violate natural justice: they would be
held guilty of a crime on the basis of an order not directed to them, made in ignorance
of the facts applicable to them, and thus, they would be deprived of their opportunity
to be heard.232 Moreover, the newspapers pointed out that if the Millett injunction
were dismissed, their status would be uncertain. 233 To hold them in contempt,
therefore, would be an expansion of the criminal law, a matter for Parliament, not the
courts.
2 3 4
1. The Vice-Chancellor's Decision
The Vice-Chancellor, after reviewing the English authorities, 235 held that a third
party had never before been held in contempt of court for breach of an order made
against another, unless he had been privy to or a party to the doing of an act that
constituted a breach of the terms of the order. 236 While the Vice-Chancellor noted that
there were Canadian and Irish authorities to the contrary, 237 he did not find them
compelling. 238 An injunction under English law, he stated, could bind only a party to
the proceedings, his agent, or his servant, but not a third party who did not aid in its
breach.239 Thus, the newspapers could not be held in contempt because they had not
aided either the Observer or The Guardian in breaching the Millett injunction as no
breach of that order had occurred. 240
While the Vice-Chancellor recognized that the underlying principle for holding
a third party liable was that a court would not allow its orders to be knowingly flouted
or frustrated, he concluded that that principle could not be extended to those who
were not parties to the original action.24' To do so, he stated, would in effect change
the jurisdiction of the courts from acting in personam to acting in rem. A court's
orders would become enforceable against all who had notice rather than against the
parties involved. A person who was not a party to an action would, as a result, be
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 950.
234. Id. at 949.
235. See United Kingdom Nirex Ltd. v. Barton, The Times, 14 Oct. 1986; Z Ltd. v. A-Z [ 1982] Q.B. 558; Cretanor
Maritime Co. v. Irish Marine Management Ltd. [1978] 1 All E.R. 164; Marengo v. Daily Sketch & Sunday Graphic Ltd.
[1948] 1 All E.R. 406; Seaward v. Patterson [1897] 1 Ch. 545; Wellesley (Lord) v. Earl of Mornington (No. 2) [1848]
11 Beav. 180; Wellesley (Lord) v. Earl of Mornington (No. 1) [1848] 11 Beav. 181, as cited in Attorney-General v.
Newspapers Publishing Pic. [1987] 3 W.L.R. 942, 951-95 (Ch. D.).
236. Attorney-General v. Newspapers Publishing Pic. [1987] 3 W.L.R. 942, 950-54 (Ch. D.).
237. See Catkey Constr. Ltd. v. Moran [1969] 8 D.L.R.3d 413; Tilco Plastics Ltd. v. Skurjat [1966] 57 D.L.R.2d
596.; Bassel's Lunch Ltd. v. Kick (No. 2) [1937] 1 D.L.R. 235; and Bassel's Lunch v. Kick (No. 1) [1936] O.R. 445,
for the Canadian authorities, and Smith-Barry v. Dawson [1891] 27 L.R. Ir. 558, for the Irish, as cited in
Attorney-General v. Newspapers Publishing Pic. [1987] 3 W.L.R. 942, 953 (Ch. D.).
238. Attorney-General v. Newspapers Publishing Pic. [1987] 3 W.L.R. 942, 953-54 (Ch. D.).
239. Id. at 954.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 955-56.
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deprived of all procedural safeguards connected to contempt proceedings and would
be denied his opportunity to present his case to the court involved. 242
The Vice-Chancellor noted that the facts of the case presented a compelling
justification for finding a legal basis to sanction the papers, but he held that the
practical consequences in other cases could not justify such an expansion of the law.
He illustrated his point with several examples. Suppose that an employer obtained an
injunction against an employee for disclosing trade secrets. If the law of contempt
were extended as the Attorney General argued it should be, another employee, not
bound by the injunction, could be held in contempt if she disclosed the same secrets.
The employer, however, might not have had a basis for enjoining her as she might
not have been bound by a duty of confidence. Yet the employee could still be
restrained by the injunction even though the employer had no action against her.243
The Attorney General argued that a distinction should be made between orders
that are personal to the parties involved and those that are not. Thus in a marital
dispute, if B, the husband, were enjoined from assaulting A, the wife, C, a third
party, would not be in contempt if she assaulted A. The order would be personal to
A and B, and C would not be guilty of contempt. 244 The Vice-Chancellor rejected this
argument, pointing out that the distinction between "plainly personal" orders and
others was too uncertain. This uncertainty, he stated, was incompatible with
imposing criminal sanctions on parties without the current procedural safeguards. 245
He concluded by noting that sanctions should be available to the government in cases
of national security, but if those sanctions were not found in the Official Secrets
Acts, 24 6 then it was for Parliament, not the courts, to devise them. 247
2. The Court of Appeal's Decision
The Court of Appeal rejected the lower court's interpretation of the law. The
court held that publication of the material covered by the Millett injunction would
constitute contempt of court not because the papers breached the original injunction,
but rather because publication would destroy the subject matter of the action between
the Attorney General and The Guardian and Observer. The papers, however, were
not held in contempt because they had not had an opportunity to put forward their
defenses, nor had the required mens rea been established. 248
In its unanimous decision, the court distinguished between actions by third
parties who aid in a breach of an injunction and actions by third parties who destroy
242. Id. at 957.
243. Id. at 956.
244. Id. at 957.
245. Id.
246. 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28; 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch. 75; 2 & 3 Geo. 6, ch. 121. Section 2 of the Official Secrets
Act provides for criminal liability for any unauthorized disclosures of official secrets. While the scope of the Act is quite
broad with respect to whom and what is covered (there are 2324 separate offenses), the number of prosecutions under it
is limited, primarily because other formal and informal sanctions exist. See generally REPORT OF THE COMM. ON SEcnoN
2 OF THE OmnciAL SEcRETS Acr 1911, Csuo. 5104; P. O'Htoms, CE'sosum iN BRniAN (1972); H. STmEEr, FREEDOM, THE
INDIVIDUAL ND THE LAw (5th ed. 1982); D. WVxutA~is, NOT IN THE PuBuc ImEREsT (1965); Dalley, supra note 98.
247. Attorney-General v. Newspapers Publishing Pic. [1987] 3 W.L.R. 942, 958 (C.A.).
248. Id. at 960.
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the subject matter of a suit and thereby interfere with the administration of justice. 249
With respect to the former, the court agreed that the Vice-Chancellor's interpretation
of the law was correct. However, the issue in this case, the court stated, was whether
publication of material restrained by an injunction could constitute contempt because
publication would destroy the subject matter of the suit and deprive the original
parties of their right to a trial.2-0
Sir John Donaldson resolved the issue by pointing to the inherently perishable
nature of confidential material:
Confidential information is like an ice cube. Give it to the party who undertakes to keep it
in his refrigerator and you still have an ice cube by the time the matter comes to trial....
Give it to the party who has no refrigerator or will not agree to keep it in one, and by the
time of the trial you just have a pool of water which neither party wants. It is the inherently
perishable nature of confidential information which gives rise to unique problems.25l
Because of the nature of the subject matter of the suit between the government and
the other papers, republication of the Wright material by the Independent and other
papers would render it "a pool of water," useless to those in the first action.25 2
The newspapers, then, had rendered the Attorney General's case less effective
and thereby interfered with the administration of justice. While the court held that the
newspapers had committed the actus tea, the criminal act, the court noted that the
necessary mens rea, the criminal intent, had not been established.253 Because the
proceedings between the Attorney General and the Observer and The Guardian were
not active within the meaning of the Contempt of Court Act,254 the strict liability rule
did not apply, and thus the court had to determine the requisite intent under the
savings provision of the Act.255 While the Attorney General argued that a reckless-
ness standard should be used, the court held that specific intent was necessary as it
comported with the statutory purpose of shifting the balance in favor of free
speech. 5 6
It is important to note that the court did not decide the papers were in contempt.
That decision has yet to be made as the court decided only the preliminary issue. In
addition, the court's decision was delivered the day after Spycatcher was published
and after the serialization by the Sunday Times had begun. The timing of the decision
and its holding, therefore, effectively cut off all future press disclosures of the book.
Any other paper publishing disclosures would have been on clear notice that it was
249. Id. at 969-72, 979-82, 985-88.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 962.
252. Id. at 968. Lloyd, L.J., extended the reasoning to any destruction of the subject matter of a suit. Thus, if the
subject matter were a race horse and an injunction existed to preserve the horse, a third party who shot the horse with
knowledge of the injunction would be guilty of contempt. Id. at 981.
253. Id. at 976-77, 983-85.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 100-06.
255. Attorney-General v. Newspapers Publishing Plc. [1987] 3 W.L.R. 942, 975-77, 983-84 (C.A.); see also
supra text accompanying note 114.
256. Attorney-General v. Newspapers Publishing Pic. [1987] 3 W.L.R. 942, 985 (C.A.). See generally RPoR OF
THE LAw Cot im. On CoTrrEMPr OF COURT, 1974, CMND. 5794.
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interfering with justice and, thus, would be presumed to have the requisite intent for
being held in contempt.2 7
The ramification of the Court of Appeal's decision is quite broad, especially
when combined with that of the House of Lords. The latter seems to establish that a
third party can be held liable in civil court for breach of confidence on the basis of
deterrence, while the former indicates that the same third party can also be criminally
liable. In both cases, the third party need not be involved with the original breach of
confidence nor be a party to the injunction.
The government, therefore, can restrain the press from publishing information it
believes should remain secret without ever having to prove that a paper breached its
duty to the state. To get a temporary injunction, all the government must show is that
it has an arguable case at trial. Once it makes that showing, further publication will
be cut off by contempt of court proceedings regardless of how widespread any
previous disclosure has been.
If the various courts' reasoning is followed, that is, if disclosure of Wright's
material was both a breach of confidence and a criminal act, then technically each
person who read Spycatcher and discussed it with others violated the law. In theory,
then, a librarian who provided a member of Parliament with a copy of the book not
only could breach his duty of confidence, but would interfere with the administration
of justice.
In fact, because the scope of these decisions was so broad, the Derbyshire
Council sought clarification from the courts concerning the potential liability of its
library. 258 The Council wanted to clarify, first, whether it would be acting in
contempt if it made Spycatcher available to the public, and second, whether it was
under an obligation to examine the newspapers it made available to determine if they
had forbidden material32 9 The court held that while the scope of that library's
distribution of the book might be limited, the House of Lords' decision required its
prohibition. 26° Because other libraries would and could follow the Derbyshire library
if the court allowed distribution, the court held it was bound to limit distribution and
minimize any damage to the Attorney General's claim before trial. The court
concluded that if the library lent copies of Spycatcher, it would have committed the
actus rea necessary for contempt of court.26' The court, however, did not require the
library to screen its periodicals to see if they contained Wright's material.2 62
IV. THE HONG KONG DECISIONS
The Hong Kong cases arose when the South China Morning Post, which had
purchased the serialization rights of Spycatcher, published a 4000-word excerpt of the
257. Attorney-General v. Newspapers Publishing Pic. [1987] 3 W.L.R. 942, 985 (C.A.) (per Lloyd, L.J.: "The
more obvious the interference with the course of justice, the more readily will the requisite intent be inferred.").
258. See Attorney-General v. Observer Ltd. [1988] 1 All E.R. 385, 387 (Ch. D.).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 397.
261. Id. at 398.
262. Id. at 399.
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book in an article similar to that published by the Sunday Times.2 63 The Attorney
General sought and obtained an ex parte injunction to restrain further publication.26 4
That injunction was similar to the one upheld by the House of Lords except that it
allowed publication of information obtained in open court in Australia. 26 5 After the
newspapers applied for its discharge, Justice Barnett dismissed the injunction.266 The
Attorney General appealed, and the Court of Appeal reinstated it in the same form.267
The arguments raised by the Attorney General both at trial and on appeal were
essentially the same as those made in England. He argued that the paper was under
a fiduciary obligation of confidence and the breach of that duty resulted not only in
a loss of confidence in the Service by friendly nations, but also in a risk that others
would emulate Wright.2 68 Once again, the Attorney General relied on Sir Robert
Armstrong's affidavit. Given that the British government had an arguable claim at
trial, the Attorney General argued that the injunction should remain in effect until a
trial on the merits. 269
The defendants, while accepting that the Attorney General had an arguable
claim, argued that his claim did not outweigh the public interest in the freedom of the
press. 270 They argued that the deterrent effect on Wright and others did not apply as
Hong Kong was not the "best market" for profit. 271 They also claimed that the
concern over harassment of Service members did not apply to Hong Kong, nor did
the arguments concerning interference with justice. 272 Thus, their case was distin-
guishable from that of the Observer and The Guardian, and, therefore, the reasoning
of the House of Lords' decision had little or no application to them.273
After canvassing the opinions of the House of Lords, Justice Barnett concluded
that he was not bound by their approach with respect to Article 10 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights, 274 but rather by the balancing approach outlined
in Lion Laboratories275 and American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd.276 That is, he had to
balance the competing interests involved.
In balancing those interests, Justice Barnett agreed with the defendants that the
interest in the freedom of the press outweighed the Attorney General's interests.
263. Attorney-General v. South China Morning Post Ltd., No. 4644 (H.C.) Aug. 24, 1987, at CNB/4. It is
interesting to note that both papers are controlled by Rupert Murdoch, who has in the past been the subject of comments
by the court. See, e.g., Schering Chem. Ltd. v. Falkman Ltd. [1982] 1 Q.B. 1, 39 (C.A.) (per Lord Templeman: "The
times of Blackstone are not relevant to the times of Mr. Murdoch.").
264. Attorney-General v. South China Morning Post Ltd., No. 4644 (H.C.) Aug. 24, 1987, at CNB/4.
265. Id.
266. Id. at MEP/5.
267. Attorney-General v. South China Morning Post Ltd., No. 114 (Civil) Sept. 8, 1987, at 17, 23.
268. Attorney-General v. South China Morning Post Ltd., No. 4644 (H.C.) Aug. 24, 1987, at CNBI5-6.
269. Id. at CNB/13-14.
270. Id. at CNB/6.
271. Id. at CNB/15-16. See supra text accompanying note 169.
272. Attorney-General v. South China Morning Post Ltd., No. 4644 (H.C.) Aug. 24, 1987, at CNB/15-16.
273. Id. at CNB/16.
274. Id. at CNB/13. See supra text accompanying notes 187-98. Justice Barnett stated that Article 10 is a factor in
the balance but that the Lords did not use the national security approach as a pronouncement of law.
275. [1985] 1 Q.B. 526 (C.A.); see also supra text accompanying notes 80-93.
276. [19751 2 W.L.R. 316 (H.L.(E.)); see also supra text accompanying note 99.
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First, while Justice Barnett accepted the arguable claim of confidence, he pointed out
that the deterrence argument had little effect in Hong Kong. 277 Second, he reiterated
the fact that the South China Morning Post was not part of the original breach, nor
did it aid in the breach.27 8 Third, he stated that the government's claims could be
satisfied by an accounting of profits or by an award of exemplary damages. 279 Thus,
while the Attorney General had an arguable claim, it would not necessarily be
destroyed by the dismissal of the injunction. 280
Justice Barnett stated, however, that the press could not be compensated by
damages and rejected the argument that the harm in delay of publication was
inconsequential: the book and its contents were "hot news" and might not be at a
later date.281 He accepted, in addition, the papers' argument that the freedom of the
press provisions in Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights282 and Hong Kong's unique political situation were factors to be weighed in
the balance. 283 With respect to the latter he stated: "There is a particular sensitivity
on the part of the Hong Kong public, to any constraint on or fettering of the free flow
of information, comment or news. . , 284 The Attorney General's claim, therefore,
did not outweigh or justify the potential damage of interfering with the freedom of the
press.
The Court of Appeal rejected Justice Barnett's reasoning, especially his view on
the use of damages as an alternative to an injunction. 285 In reinstating the injunction,
the court adopted Lord Templeman's reasoning, pointing out that the differences
between Hong Kong and England were not sufficiently important to require the
injunction's dismissal. 286 The court also accepted the Attorney General's arguable
claim and held that his claim and the interest of national security justified restraints
on the press. 287 The court concluded that there was no material difference between the
harm to the Service in England and the harm to it in Hong Kong, as the Service acted
for both countries and was present in both. 288 The court dispensed with the lower
court's concern over Hong Kong's political future by pointing out that the provisions
of Article 19 would remain in force after 1997 and by stating that courts do not react
to political pressure. 289 The situation after 1997, they continued, was irrelevant, as
277. Attorney-General v. South China Morning Post Ltd., No. 4644 (H.C.) Aug. 24, 1987, at CNB/16.
278. Id.
279. Id. at MEPI.
280. Id.
281. Id. at MEP/2.
282. G.A. res. 2200 A (XXI) Mar. 23, 1976, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368, 374 (1967). Article 19 is similar to Article
10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See supra note 187.
283. Hong Kong reverts to Chinese control in 1997. See A Draft Agreement between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Future
ofHang Kong (Sept. 26, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1366 (1984).
284. Attorney-General v. South China Morning Post Ltd., No. 4644 (H.C.) Aug. 24, 1987, at MEP/3.
285. Attorney-General v. South China Morning Post Ltd., No. 114 (Civil) Sept. 8, 1987.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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the protection of freedoms in the future would continue to depend on the integrity of
the courts. 290
The Hong Kong case illustrates the British government's resolve to prevent the
publication of Spycatcher. It must be remembered that this case was not the only one
the government pursued beyond its borders. During the course of the summer, the
government was, in essence, fighting battles on several fronts at home and abroad
and in the process expending time and energy to prevent the press from publishing
information already published and freely available to the public.
Moreover, the Court of Appeal's decision may, in fact, establish a dangerous
precedent, given that Hong Kong will revert to Chinese control in 1997. The limits
of a free press may be determined by this case, and if so, the integrity of the courts
may not be sufficient to prevent prior restraints on the press. By accepting the House
of Lords' reasoning, the court implicitly rejected the concept that any delay in
publication interferes with the press's function of promptly providing the public with
news. With such a rejection, the court may indeed have established unfortunate
precedent.
The British government's success at obtaining temporary injunctions should not
be interpreted as an isolated incident of a government seeking to protect its vital
security interests from disclosure by an irresponsible press. The information Peter
Wright disclosed was not classified, and while his actions may have been a breach of
his duty to the state, the actions of the press were not. The press did not aid Wright
in breaching his duty. They proposed to do nothing more, as Lord Oliver noted, than
their job: to collect and disseminate the news and thereby provide a forum for public
discussion of Wright's allegations.
The cases do, however, establish or reaffirm the fact that the freedom of the
press is limited in England and Hong Kong. By using the double-edged sword of a
breach of confidence action and a contempt of court proceeding, the British
government can temporarily prevent the press from legally commenting on public
issues. When combining the legal theories, the government does not have to prove
that discussion of the public issues will be harmful to the state. It need only present
an arguable case of a breach of duty, and as these cases demonstrate, that burden is
not great. All the government has to show is that the originator of the information
owed a duty of confidence, and the press is then under a fiduciary obligation not to
disclose the material.
Once that is established, the press has the burden of showing an overriding
public interest in publication. Their burden, on the other hand, is a heavy one. The
amount of prior dissemination of the material is not dispositive, nor is the interest in
disclosing wrongdoing by the government. The former will be irrelevant because of
the original duty of confidence and the latter useless because the courts seem to
require that such disclosures be made to the government itself. The government,
therefore, instead of having to rely on internal measures to prevent disclosure or on
290. Id.
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the prosecution of those responsible, can achieve the same results by prosecuting the
press. It should also be remembered that these cases focused only on the temporary
injunction. Thus, the issues raised had not yet been fully explored or decided.
Nevertheless, for over a year the press was deprived of its ability to act as a forum
for discussion of issues that were matters of great public concern and rather wide
public knowledge.
The effect of these cases on the press is clear. The press can be prevented from
publishing information the government wishes to remain secret. That is not,
however, the only effect. Because the government proceeded on a breach of
confidence action, the precedents established in these cases may be applicable to all
such actions. It may be that an employer as well as the government can use these
same techniques to deter employees from divulging trade secrets or to stop the press
from publishing information about safety violations. Therefore, by expanding the law
in this instance, the courts may have opened the door for even wider restraints on
open discussion of public issues.
V. THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION
The underlying issues involved in the Spycatcher cases were not resolved until
October of 1988 when the House of Lords upheld the Chancery Court's dismissal of
the temporary injunction. In deciding to dismiss the injunction the courts focused on
five issues: (1) whether Wright breached his duty of confidence when he published
Spycatcher; (2) whether the Observer and The Guardian breached their duty of
confidence when they originally published Wright's allegation in 1986; (3) whether
the Sunday Times breached its duty when it serialized portions of Spycatcher in 1987;
(4) whether a permanent injunction was appropriate given the wide availability of the
book; and (5) whether the courts could issue a preventive injunction to prohibit the
papers from publishing or commenting on other information Wright may publish in
the future.
The government and the press raised essentially the same arguments they had
made in the earlier cases. At trial, the Attorney General relied on several
propositions. 29' He argued that Wright owed a duty to the government not to disclose
unauthorized information. Wright's duty was based both on his employment status
and the interests of national security. Because he breached that duty by writing
Spycatcher, the publication of the book constituted a continuing breach. The
newspapers knew that the information he disclosed was confidential and represented
a breach of duty. Thus, when the newspapers received it, they stood in the same
position as Wright, and because subsequent publication would not relieve him of his
duty, it likewise could not release the newspapers of theirs. The government, in
addition, relied on its national security interests, but instead of basing its claim on
secrecy, which of course was destroyed, it relied on the importance of promoting the
efficiency and the reputation of the Service.
291. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 831-34 (Ch. D.).
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The newspapers contended that any duty of confidence that may have existed
could not extend to disclosures of serious iniquities, and thus, their publication of the
Wright allegations concerning Sir Roger Hollis and the destabilization of the Wilson
government were legitimate.29 2 The papers, moreover, argued that the publication of
Spycatcher and its wide distribution destroyed the confidential nature of the
information and thereby destroyed any duty they may have had. Finally, they pointed
out that the injunction sought by the Attorney General conflicted with the provisions
of Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. 293
The government responded by pointing out that publication could not destroy the
duty of confidence, as the government itself was not responsible for the disclosure,
and, further, that even if Wright's allegations were true, the iniquity defense did not
justify publication. The proper procedure was to notify the appropriate authorities,
not the public.2 94
The courts resolved these issues by what appears to be a straightforward
application of the law of confidence. The decisions, however, are ambiguous. In
some ways, they potentially offer the newspapers greater protection from further
inroads on their freedom to publish, and in other ways, they provide the government
with additional means to limit the free flow of information.
A. Chancery Division
Judge Scott began his opinion by providing an overview of the history of the
case and by comparing the allegations in Spycatcher to those that had been previously
published in books, interviews, and on television programs.295 He then turned to the
issues of law and fact. He characterized Wright's duty to the government as one of
secrecy rather than confidence because an actual confider-confidant relationship did
not exist between Wright and the government. Wright, therefore, was obligated to
maintain secrecy with respect to information he received whether it was from
someone to whom he owed no duty of confidence or was information he discovered
himself.296 The distinction is not particularly significant because the obligation
imposed did not have to arise from an express or implied contract or a particular
relationship; it could be imposed by equity if the circumstances by which Wright
obtained the information created a confidential obligation.2 97
In the case of Wright, however, Judge Scott refused to impose a blanket duty of
secrecy covering all the information Wright may have received. The duty, he said,
could not extend to trivial or useless information (the Service meal plan or the amount
of paper shredded in a waste reduction campaign), or necessarily to information
292. Id. at 834.
293. Id. at 835; see supra note 187.
294. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 835 (Ch. D.).
295. Id. at 813-31.
296. Id. at 837.
297. Id. at 838. See also Faccenda Chicken Ltd. v. Fowler [1986] 3 W.L.R. 288 (C.A.); Seager v. Copydex Ltd.
[1967] 1 W.L.R. 923 (C.A.); supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
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readily available to the public. Moreover, he noted that when the government, and
not a private citizen, sought to protect its information, it had to show that disclosure
would harm the public interest in secrecy and that a countervailing interest was not
superior. 298 The extent of Wright's duty, therefore, was "dependent, in relation to the
information sought to be protected, on the relative weight of the needs of national
security that the information should be kept secret, and the public or private interest
... that the information should be free to be disclosed.' '299
Although Judge Scott held that the government's interest in secrecy outweighed
any interest Wright may have had in publishing Spycatcher, his interpretation of the
duty owed to the government is noteworthy. He appeared to place the burden on the
government to show its interest was paramount and limited the extent of secrecy the
government could claim was necessary. He refused to speculate, for example,
whether the result might have been different had Wright only published trivial
information, allegations previously disclosed, or allegations of wrongdoing by the
Service. 300 His interpretation, however, should not be read as opening the door for
other members of the Service to publish unauthorized but limited memoirs. He
endorsed the current system requiring members and ex-members to obtain authority
prior to any publication and accepted the Attorney General's argument that "prima
facie" members of the Service "must carry their secrets with them to the grave. ' 30'
Even though Judge Scott held that Wright had breached his duty, he did not hold
the newspapers to the same standard. He limited the duty of third parties who
obtained information knowing it was confidential to circumstances that raised "an
obligation of conscience. ' 30 2 He pointed out that there could be circumstances
involving public interest factors that applied to a third party and not to the original
confidant. In the case of the newspapers, those factors were the press's legitimate role
in disseminating information to the public, the defense of iniquity, and constraints
imposed by Article 10.303
Judge Scott acknowledged that Article 10 had not been incorporated into English
law, but he accepted the Sunday Times' argument that when courts balance the
competing public interests of the press and the government, they should do so in a
manner consistent with the government's treaty obligations. Because Article 10 only
allows for restrictions on the press that are necessary, he relied on two decisions by
the European Court of Human Rights3° 4 to define necessary and held that the press
could not be restrained unless there was a "pressing social need" for the restraint,
and the restraint was "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued." 305
298. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) 11988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 840-46 (Ch. D.). See also
Attorney-General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd. [1975] 3 W.L.R. 606 (Q.B.D.); Australia v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd. [1980]
147 C.L.R. 39.
299. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 846 (Ch. D.).
300. Id. at 854-55.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 848.
303. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 81-93, 187.
304. Lingens v. Austria [1986] 8 E.H.R.R. 407; Sunday Times v. United Kingdom [1979] 2 E.H.R.R. 245.
305. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 851 (Ch. D.).
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Judge Scott held that the government's claim for an injunction against the
Observer and The Guardian for the articles they published in 1986 was not justified
by a pressing social need. First, the articles, he stated, presented fair reports of the
government's action in Australia. While they contained information that had not been
previously published, the amount of information was not sufficient to constitute a
breach of duty. Second, he accepted the newspapers' argument that the allegations
concerning the destabilization of the Wilson government and the plot to assassinate
President Nasser qualified under the iniquity defense. 3°6 The newspapers had a
legitimate basis for reporting the information directly to the public; they were not
bound to limit the disclosure to an investigating authority. Judge Scott acknowledged
that the government might have been embarrassed by the disclosure, but he held that
embarrassment was not a sufficient interest to prevent publication:
[T]he ability of the press freely to report allegations of scandals in government is one of the
bulwarks of our democratic society. It could not happen in totalitarian countries. If the price
that has to be paid is the exposure of the government of the day to pressure or embarrassment
when mischievous and false allegations are made, then, in my opinion, that price must be
paid. 307
He concluded that the editors of those papers properly decided that the public
disclosure of the confidential material was justified.
The Sunday Times, however, had in his judgment breached their duty of
confidence. The serialized excerpt of Spycatcher was not limited to the Service's
wrongdoing, nor had the editors exercised discretion in their determination of what
was and was not legitimate information to place before the public. Accordingly, he
held the papers liable for any profits that resulted from the July 1987 article. 30s
Judge Scott's opinion with respect to the Millett injunction is troubling. Even
though he stressed the important role of the press in a democratic society, he undercut
that role by subjecting the papers to the traditional balancing test used in the law of
confidence. Thus, the Sunday Times was held liable because its editors did not
properly weigh the competing interests involved, and the Observer and The Guardian
stepped beyond the bounds of legitimate public interest by publishing Wright's
allegations about Burgess and Churchill's daughter. Unfortunately, it is not clear
what is or is not in the public interest. The balance appears to be on the side of the
government and in favor of restraint. The press is free to report allegations of gross
abuse by the government, but they are not free to comment on abuses that may not
rise to that level but are nevertheless appropriate subjects for public debate. The
restraints are imposed not because the information necessarily threatens national
security, but because the source of the information itself was one who was obligated
by virtue of his employment to remain silent.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 81-93.
307. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 858-59 (Ch. D.).
308. Id. at 859-60.
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The newspapers, however, fared better when it came to the permanent
injunction. Judge Scott again engaged in a balancing test, weighing the claims of
national security against the public interest in freedom of the press. In support of
restraint, the government relied on several claims made by Sir Robert Armstrong. 30 9
Sir Robert first asserted that further disclosures would damage the trust members of
the Service had for each other. Judge Scott rejected this claim, noting that the damage
had already been done. Second, Sir Robert argued that others could be tempted to
follow Wright's example. Judge Scott dismissed this claim as well by pointing out
that if another ex-Service member tried to publish his memoirs in England, he would
be enjoined from doing so, and if he sought to publish outside the jurisdiction, Wright
already served as an example.
Sir Robert also argued that if a permanent injunction were not granted, the press
could pressure current or ex-members to confirm, deny, or expound on Wright's
allegations. Judge Scott accepted that this claim should weigh in the balancing, but
he did note its speculative nature. Next, Sir Robert argued that informers and friendly
foreign nations would lose confidence in the Service if the injunction were not
granted. As with earlier claims, Judge Scott simply noted that the damage had already
occurred. Judge Scott also rejected the government's claim that an injunction would
protect against the disclosure of the methods, personnel, and organization of the
Service. He noted that the claim could justify prohibiting members from publishing
their memoirs, but it could not justify enjoining the press, as that information was
already available. Finally, Judge Scott held that the government's claim that an
injunction would improve the morale of the Service was beyond the scope of the law
of confidence. The duties owed by the press were not based on the maintenance of
morale, but on the maintenance of secrecy.
In refusing to grant the permanent injunction, Judge Scott accepted the papers'
arguments that the information the government sought to restrain was in the public
domain, and, moreover, it was information that could properly be placed before the
public. He held, therefore, that because no "obligation of conscience" existed, the
papers were free to publish and comment on the Wright allegations. 310
Judge Scott also refused to grant the Attorney General's request for a preventive
injunction prohibiting the papers from publishing any part of "Spycatcher 2," should
it surface. He recognized that the government's fear of an additional volume of
memoirs was legitimate, but he refused to rule on issues that had not yet arisen. He
did note, however, that the remedy of an accounting of profits was available. 311
Even though the newspapers were successful, their success was limited. The
court's refusal to grant a permanent injunction was based primarily on the previous
publication of Spycatcher and its widespread availability. The relative weight given
to the competing interests no doubt would have been different if the government had
taken steps to prevent earlier publications of the same allegations made by Wright or
309. Id. at 860-61. See also supra note 120.
310. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) 11988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 862-63 (Ch. D.).
311. Id. at 865.
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if Spycatcher had not been published. Thus, the decision was not based on a
recognized right of newspaper editors to choose what information they will or will not
publish, but rather it was based on the recognition that, in this case, injunctive relief
could serve no purpose. There are, of course, legitimate limits that may be imposed
on the press, but those limits must be clearly defined. By relying on the balancing test
incorporated in the law of confidence, this decision suggests that if confidential
information concerns the Service, the balance will fall in favor of the government
unless injunctive relief is futile. The press, in essence, is in no better position than it
was at the outset of the litigation.
B. The Appellate Decisions
Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords upheld the lower court
decision and, in doing so, accepted Judge Scott's interpretation of the law and its
application to the facts. Thus, the courts refused to grant a permanent injunction
against the papers. They held that the Observer and The Guardian had not breached
their duties, but that the Sunday Times had, and they refused to grant the Attorney
General a preventive injunction with respect to "Spycatcher 2."
Because the various judges primarily reiterated Judge Scott's conclusions, each
opinion will not be discussed in detail. Rather, the opinions will be used to
demonstrate that when the government uses the law of confidence to restrain the press
from publishing information connected to national security, it will be successful
unless the information the press seeks to disclose was already available to the public
through no fault of the press.
All of the judges accepted the premise that the freedom of the press is limited by
the law of confidence and that the press is not entitled to any greater protection than
that owed to an ordinary citizen. The balance of competing interests will be weighted
differently, however, simply because of the role of the press to disseminate
information to the public. If the press is involved in a breach of confidence action,
the courts, because of the public interest in freedom of the press, must engage in a
balancing test. If an action is between the government and the press, the government
has the burden to prove not only that the information is confidential, but also that it
is in the public interest to withhold the information. 312
Lord Keith of Kinkel, for example, relied on the distinction established in
Australia v. John Fairfax & Son Ltd.313 to demonstrate the difference between a
claim of confidence by the government and a claim by a private citizen:
The equitable principle has been fashioned to protect the personal, private and proprietary
interests of the citizen, not to protect the very different interests of the executive
government. It acts, or is supposed to act, not according to standards of private interest, but
in the public interest. This is not to say that equity will not protect information in the hands
312. Id. at 892, 906; see also Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776,783-85
(H.L.(E.)); Attorney-General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd. [1976] 1 Q.B. 752; Australia v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd. [1980] 147
C.L.R. 39.
313. [1980] 147 C.L.R. 39.
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of the government, but it is to say that when equity protects government information it will
look at the matter through different spectacles .... Accordingly, the court will determine
the government's claim to confidentiality by reference to the public interest. Unless
disclosure is likely to injure the public interest, it will not be protected. 314
If the government's claim of confidence is based on national security, injury to the
public interest will be presumed, and the public interest in maintaining secrecy will,
prima facie, outweigh the public interest in freedom of the press. 3 15 In order to
overcome the prima facie case, the press must show that the information is no longer
confidential, that it is trivial or useless, or that it concerns iniquities. The opinions of
the various judges on appeal, however, suggest that the press is not likely to
overcome the prima facie case unless it proves that the information is not
confidential.
1. Loss of Confidentiality
The majority opinions of both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords
suggest that if the press can show that the information they seek to publish is in the
public domain, the government will be denied permanent injunctive relief. The
various judges, for example, agreed that the information the newspapers sought to
publish was no longer confidential: Spycatcher had been widely published and it was
readily available in England. However, the judges used different rationales.
Lord Keith of Kinkel, for example, did not base his decision on a balance of the
competing interests involved, but simply stated that all of the harm that could have
resulted to the Service had already occurred. He noted, however, that there could be
a case where widespread publication would not destroy the duty of confidence, but
his examples were limited to private, not government, interests. 316 Lord Griffiths
approached the issue by balancing the competing interests and held that the freedom
of the press outweighed the national security interest because the latter had been
diminished by previous publications. 317 Lord Goff took a different approach. He
reserved the question of whether an obligation owed, even one owed by the original
confidant, could continue once the subject matter of the obligation was destroyed by
publication. He suggested that the appropriate remedies may be criminal or legal and
not equitable ones. 318
Sir Donaldson relied on the balancing test with respect to the Observer and The
Guardian, but in his dissent he argued that the Sunday Times should have been
restrained from serializing Spycatcher. He stated that because the paper stood in the
shoes of Wright by virtue of its having purchased the serialization rights from
Heinemann, it could be restrained from publishing the full excerpts of the book.3 19
314. Id. at 51-52.
315. See Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) 1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 868, 892, 908-09 (C.A.);
Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776, 815 (H.L.(E.)).
316. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776, 786 (H.L.(E.)).
317. Id. at 798.
318. Id. at 810-13.
319. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 887 (C.A.); see also
Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776, 802 (H.L.(E.)) (per Lord Griffiths).
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The majority opinions rejected Sir Donaldson's analysis. While the judges
recognized that it was inconsistent to prohibit Wright and Heinemann from directly
publishing what the Sunday Times could publish indirectly, they relied on a balancing
test to justify serialization. The government's interest was not sufficient to prevent
the newspaper from publishing in serialized form a book that could be purchased from
a bookseller or borrowed from a library.320
Under any of the above approaches, a newspaper should be able to defeat a
government claim of confidentiality. If the balancing test is used, the public interest
in a free press should prevail because once the information is published, any injury
to the government will already have occurred. If that test is not used, the press should
still prevail because injunctive relief, as a remedy, would not serve any purpose. A
newspaper could still be subject, however, to a legal or criminal remedy, such as an
accounting of profits, but again, that may depend on where the balance of interests
lies and whether the paper directly aided the original confidant.321
2. Trivial or Useless Information
The defense that the information is trivial or useless and thus cannot be
confidential relies on the common sense notion that the interest involved is not worth
protecting. In a commercial setting the defense would be absolute, but in the context
of national security it may be limited.
As noted earlier, Judge Scott suggested that the courts were not in a position to
draw the line between what was and was not trivial unless those who could had
refused to draw any line at all:
National security is the responsibility of the executive government; what action is needed to
protect its interests is ... a matter upon which those upon whom the responsibility rests, and
not the courts of justice, must have the last word. It is par excellence a non-justiciable
question. The judicial process is totally inept to deal with the sorts of problems which it
involves. 322
Lord Griffiths echoed this point of view, stating that a bright line rule is necessary to
protect the secrecy of the Service. He emphasized that members of the Service should
be prohibited from releasing any information, regardless of how trivial it may seem,
because information that may seem trivial to one person could provide the missing
link sought by a hostile agency. 323
Even though he was referring to members of the Service, it is unlikely that Lord
Griffiths would hold the press to a different standard. If a balancing test were used,
the government interest in secrecy would outweigh the press's interest in publication.
What is ironic is that the more trivial the information the less likely the press will be
able to justify disclosure based on a legitimate public interest. The government,
320. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776, 792, 816-17 (I.L.(E.));
Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 900, 914 (C.A.).
321. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
322. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 841 (Ch.D.) (quoting Council
of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv. [1985 A.C. 374, 412).
323. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776, 795 (H.L.(E.)).
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however, would still be able to justify restraint based on an argument that the trivial
information could be damaging if used by a hostile agency. Of course, if the
information is utterly trivial-the meal plan of the Service-the government would
be hard pressed to show any potential damage, but in such a case, it is unlikely that
the press would be interested in disclosing the information anyway. A defense based
on the trivial nature of the information, therefore, will not, in most cases, be
sufficient to overcome the government's prima facie case.
3. The Iniquity Defense
While the issue of whether the Observer and The Guardian breached their duty
of confidence based on the 1986 articles was of little practical significance, this
aspect of the Spycatcher cases, more than any other, demonstrates the strength of the
government's ability to limit the freedom of the press and, thereby, public debate.
At trial and on appeal, the two papers relied on the iniquity defense. They argued
in essence that the public interest in exposing the wrongdoing by the Service
outweighed the government's interest in maintaining secrecy. The courts at all three
levels accepted the papers' argument, but in doing so, the courts did not provide clear
guidelines as to what is necessary to justify disclosure based on the defense. Two
conflicting approaches emerge from the various opinions. In one, the government
would be the ultimate decisionmaker, and in the other, the press would decide.
Under the test established by Sir Donaldson, 324 a newspaper would not be
justified in publishing an allegation concerning the Service unless the parliamentary
system broke down; that is, the paper would first have to report the allegation to
everyone in the chain of command, including the Director of the Service, the Prime
Minister, and the Opposition, and if they all refused to conduct an investigation, the
paper could publish the allegation. The paper, however, would be justified in
publishing only the allegation itself, not any of the supporting evidence. According
to Sir Donaldson, disclosure of the evidence could not be justified because of the
immense damage that could result if the operational methods of the Service were
discovered.
Sir Donaldson also limited what could constitute iniquity. He suggested that
even though the Service was not above the law, common sense and discretion should
prevail. Thus, in his view, an allegation concerning burglary or surveillance would
not qualify as iniquity, but an allegation of physical violence would.
Lord Griffiths essentially agreed with Sir Donaldson. He suggested that an editor
should first inform the Treasury Solicitor in order to enable the government to seek
an injunction so that the courts could decide the issue. 325 He suggested, for example,
that if Wright had first approached the newspapers with the allegations concerning Sir
Roger Hollis, and the Nasser and Wilson plots, the editors' duty would have been "to
324. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 876-80 (C.A.).
325. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776, 804-05 (H.L.(E.)).
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report the allegations immediately to the appropriate minister and only to consider
publication ... if convinced that no effective action had been taken."326
If the views of Lord Griffiths and Sir Donaldson represent the current state of the
iniquity defense, then realistically, in any case involving serious misconduct by the
government, it is the government and not the press that decides what information is
appropriate to place before the public. Even if an editor were to contact the Treasury
Solicitor, so that the courts, rather than the government, made the ultimate decision,
the Spycatcher cases themselves suggest that the courts would defer to the
government unless the information were already in the public domain. The govern-
ment, therefore, will decide how much and what kind of information the public will
receive.
The other interpretation of the defense would leave the decision in the hands of
the editors. Under this approach, the editor would have to conduct the balancing test
incorporated in the law of confidence and in Article 10. The editor would first have
to determine if the allegation were credible, but he would be able to rely on the
apparent credibility of his source. 327 Judge Bingham, for example, stated that the
newspapers were entitled to rely on the apparent credibility of Wright given his long
experience with the Service. 328 Next, the editor would have to determine what harm
could result from publication and consider whether the disclosure should be made to
the appropriate authorities rather than to the public. 329 Finally, he would have to
weigh the competing interests. Under this approach, if the editor "asks himself the
right questions and gives them the right answers, that is enough; he is not required to
submit his copy to the authorities for clearance before publication. ' 330
It is not clear which interpretation of the defense represents the current view of
the law. The majority of the opinions in the House of Lords, for example, did not
focus on the issue. The Lords simply upheld the lower court's decision, noting that
the disclosures were limited and represented a fair report of the government's action
in Australia. However, given the history of the Spycatcher cases, the ease with which
the courts imposed the temporary injunction, and the strong presumption in favor of
the protection of government secrets in cases of national security, the views held by
Sir Donaldson and Lord Griffiths may be controlling. If so, the only means for the
press to overcome the government's prima facie case is to prove that the information
has already been published. A defense based on iniquity would not be sufficient
except under very limited circumstances. And even if the less restrictive view is
controlling, the defense would still be limited to those few cases in which the balance
of interests would justify disclosure.
Thus, even though the government lost its case with respect to the permanent
injunction, it may have won the battle. The decisions of the three courts provide the
326. Id. at 804.
327. See Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 897, 917 (C.A.).
328. Id. at 917.
329. Id. at 897.
330. Id. at 898.
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government with plenty of ammunition to use against the press and leave the press
with few workable defenses.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Spycatcher cases leave several issues unresolved: the role of Article 10 in
cases involving the press and the law of confidence, the status of the iniquity defense,
and the scope of the law of confidence itself. The latter may have been expanded to
incorporate actions based on deterrence or based on detriment to the morale of those
affected by disclosure of confidential material. In its attempt to prevent the press from
disclosing Wright's allegations, the government may have expanded the law to such
an extent as to limit the freedom of the press to publish information relating to
government abuse to but a few narrow instances when the public is already aware of
the information.
The cases show that if a newspaper publishes confidential information, the
government will succeed in restraining the paper from further disclosures until an
action on the merits occurs. It will also be able to prevent other papers from
commenting on the information by an action for contempt of court. When the trial on
the main action occurs, the government is likely to win unless the information
becomes available by publication abroad. The government, therefore, has the
potential to determine what information the public receives and to define the scope of
any inquiry into its activities. The government need only claim that it is protecting the
national security of the country, and unless its claim has absolutely no merit, the press
will be unable to serve as a forum for public comment and debate.
If the freedom of the press is one of the bulwarks of a democratic society, then
the Spycatcher cases may be but the first attack in an onslaught against the press.
While one might be tempted to empathize with a government attempting to protect
the secrecy of its intelligence agencies, it is not the agencies or the government that
suffer if the attacks are successful, but the very institutions designed to protect a free
society. When a government is capable of insulating itself from criticism and charges
of abuse, its citizens are denied the information necessary to make responsible
choices, and in the end, they, not the press, must bear the ultimate consequences of
the government's actions.
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